The red line and the alternative

The debate has become chronic: how should the centre and right-wing parties react to the rise of the far right? The border between the two is wide, but it is not easy to differentiate.

One alternative is not to make a pact. The other is to reach government agreements while preserving the democratic principles of the right-wing and centre-right parties. The first is simple because it is radical, the second is complex because it can be adjusted.

In the first alternative, the far right is isolated and has no influence over the right; in the second, yes. Coalition politics encourages the adoption of some of the principles of the far right. The far right will support the government in power in exchange for influencing the policies that are deployed. Anything that blurs the boundaries between the right and the far right is negative for democracy. Radicalism, aggressiveness, and a lack of respect for difference, the essence of democracy, is the core of the far right's ideology. Its strategy is lying (in politics all parties lie to some degree, but no one can deny that Trump is a compulsive liar, just as Goebbels was in Germany or Ciano and Alfieri in Italy, the latter with more intelligence and more subtlety and, therefore, more dangerous).

The far right needs to create an external enemy that generates fear. In the past it was the Jews, "unsolidary and exploitative greedy people who want to destroy the State." Today it is immigration, "which will steal what is ours, reduce jobs, drain public aid that could be allocated to native citizens, create insecurity, introduce a new religion and an intransigent ideology far removed from Christianity and democracy."... If verification of the lie is difficult, its effectiveness increases.

A lie, to be effective and credible, must have parts of truth. If it is all false, it will be easily identifiable. The effectiveness of a lie lies in repetition: once it has been heard many times, it cannot be false. If everyone says so…There is no political party that repeats the same thing over and over again more than the far right. Now, Make America Great Again; in the 1930s, the need for living space with a common leitmotiv: gaining space, conquering territory; now, Greenland, Canada and Panama for the US; in the 1930s, Russia and Eastern Europe for Germany, and the Balkans and North Africa for Italy. It is legitimate to wonder how far the US will go with political pressure to achieve mining exploitation in Ukraine.

It is argued that isolating the far right is giving them arguments for victimhood, which they will use to win votes when there are elections. The prevailing belief is that red lines make the far right grow. It is a TRUE without proof, but widely repeated. Nobody knows for sure, but it is a socially accepted idea.

To govern with the extreme right is to give them influence and, therefore, to promote their ideology and social confrontation, because a characteristic of the extreme right is the hatred of what is different, of those who disagree with their ideas. truths. Hatred that is expressed with greater or lesser crudeness, but that leaves a mark. In short, in the centre-right or the right, governing with the extreme right contaminates them: it means allowing hatred, aggressive antagonism, and rejection of what is different to gain ground. The reason for the right and the centre-right to make a pact with the extreme right is electoral calculation.

A parallel has been drawn between the fascisms of the 1930s and the far right of the 21st century. What we have now is the beginning of what was fully developed then, once fascism conquered the state, in Berlin in 1933 and in Rome ten years earlier – incidentally, as Trump did in the USA, this time, as then, with free elections. After that, the aggressive expansion of fascist ideas was only stopped by war. The question that must be asked is: would it not have been easier to oppose Russia with all the necessary military force when the invasion of Ukraine began than now, when a return has been established on the ground and there is a death toll of one million among Russians and Ukrainians? Can anyone think that the desire to attack neighbours and demonstrate regional superiority is less important for Russia now than when the invasion of Ukraine began? Probably, the justification of a policy pursued by Russia for three years makes it more difficult to change it now: precedent conditions.

The policy of the West (led by the USA) towards Russia after the collapse of the USSR in 1989 was wrong because it was aggressive and confrontational, taking advantage of the weak. Europe made the mistake of not opposing it. It is true that Russia is part of Europe, and the complementarity of Europe (high population, abundant technology, high level of education, large market with purchasing power, lack of energy) contrasts with Russia, which is the complete opposite. Here, however, is the possible fit.

Our mistake as Europeans always has the same origin: the comfort that leads us to react late. We do so in relation to the extreme right and we do so in relation to our foreign policy.