The extraordinary regularization: successes and shortcomings
This week, the Council of Ministers approved the processing of an extraordinary regularization program that could benefit more than 500,000 undocumented immigrants or asylum seekers. While this decision is exceptional in the current European context, it is not in Spain: it will be the tenth extraordinary regularization program, following the three under Felipe González, the five under José María Aznar, and the last one (in 2005) under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Since then, the residency permit based on long-term residence has allowed for the annual regularization of a significant number of people.
However, this regularization is different in both form and substance. In form, because it stems from a grassroots legislative initiative, driven by migrant groups, which garnered over 700,000 signatures and the support of 900 organizations. No other initiative presented in Congress has achieved such broad and diverse support. It is also different in substance, because this time we are not talking about regularizing workers with job offers, family members of residents, students, or people in particularly vulnerable situations, but rather people who live among us regardless of their circumstances.
Like all previous regularization processes, this one operates according to a dual logic: that of the markets and that of rights. The market logic relates to the demands of the business sector, which, in contexts of economic growth like the current one, always laments the lack of sufficient workers. The Ministry of Public Works stated in December: "We need immigration like the water we drink or the air we breathe." The (logical) demand of employers, but also of unions, is that those already here must first be legally recognized before facilitating the arrival of those from abroad. While regularization allows for an immediate response to these needs, in the medium term many regularized workers tend to move to better-paying jobs, thus, over time and in certain sectors, reigniting that "hunger" for new workers. The agricultural sector in Almería is a prime example.
The logic of rights is shared by migrant groups, left-wing parties, the Spanish Episcopal Conference, and social organizations like Caritas. Anyone who knows someone in an irregular situation knows that having a residence permit is a necessary condition (though not a guarantee) for access to fundamental rights and a dignified life. But rights also have a collective dimension: only when they are guaranteed to everyone without exception can we build safe and cohesive societies, without the exclusion of some ultimately affecting everyone else.
It is clear that these two logics represent two very different sectors of society, which on the ideological spectrum fall on both the right and the left. Furthermore, although it is not usually the primary cause, the State also has its own reasons. One is that regularization allows for a reduction in the informal economy and, therefore, increases tax revenue. It is estimated that each person whose status is regularized could contribute an average of around 4,000 euros annually to the State coffers. The other reason has to do with the need to make tabula trench Regarding migration policies that are considered dysfunctional. It's always been said, but never done. The Spanish migration model continues to be based on irregularity, which is explained by the combination of a labor market hungry for precarious workers and policies that fail to recognize de facto Entry for work purposes and an open Atlantic border combined with the possibility of regularization a posteriori.
There is no doubt that this extraordinary regularization is very good news, but I must conclude with two warnings. As has already been pointed out Maria Martin and Javier de LucasPushing for regularization through a royal decree in exchange for a budget betrays the original spirit of the initiative, which, besides originating from the grassroots, included very diverse sectors of Spanish society and politics. In other words, what was once a cause for many risks being interpreted as a separate agreement, made for the self-serving reasons of a few (the PSOE and Podemos). The second warning goes beyond regularization itself: although those who have been regularized already live here, any pro-immigration policy should necessarily be accompanied by a restructuring of infrastructure and public services. Failing to do so prioritizes market logic over the welfare state, something that undoubtedly fuels votes for the far right.
