Strategic independence and interdependence

Strategic sovereignty—or independence, or autonomy—are interchangeable terms that denote the set of public policies that respond to and adapt to the new and heightened geopolitical uncertainty generated by the succession of challenges that have shaken the 21st century. These began with the 2008 financial crisis and continued with the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the development of AI by American and Chinese digital giants, President Trump's new proposals for the international economic order, and the emergence of China as a major competitor in high-tech products. Given that the adoption of a principle of strategic sovereignty will greatly influence what we do or do not do, it is worthwhile to analyze the scope of the concept. I offer two observations: 1. The notion of strategic sovereignty is not intended to be a universal principle, as, for example, the principles of free markets or decarbonization are: if we believe they are good for a country, it follows that they are also good for the regions within that country. In fact, it is understood that these principles are advisable for any country. However, strategic sovereignty must always be linked to the sphere of the political entity to which it applies. In our case, its relevance is at the European level, which for me means the EU and the United Kingdom. At this level, it is a principle that, when properly applied, is highly appropriate and strengthens Europe. A paradoxical consequence of the objective of strengthening Europe is that neither Tarragona, nor Catalonia, nor Spain should aspire to this sovereignty. The adoption of the principle strengthens Europe, while its adoption by individual European states weakens Europe, and those states themselves. Strategic sovereignty is defensive in nature, and Europe will not be strengthened if the prevailing attitude of the states is one of distrust and protectionism. For those of us who want to play the European card—for me, the only card worth playing—what is desirable is strategic independence externally and strategic interdependence internally. From Catalonia and Spain, what is in our best interest is for Europe to make the strategic sovereignty program a cornerstone of its economic competitiveness and, at the same time, for Catalonia and Spain to integrate themselves as effectively as possible into the value chains associated with this program. It is also important that European institutions place similar emphasis on both aspects. For example, externally, we need to have our own structures—derived from our own knowledge—for AI or satellites. Internally, we need to develop infrastructures designed to facilitate collective efficiency, and therefore interdependence, among European economies. In short: we must vigorously promote the content of the Letta-Draghi reports.

2. Promoting Europe's strategic sovereignty should not be confused with an ambition for autarky or with the bloc of ideas of classical protectionism. We can engage in dialogue with the idea of protecting infant industries—an idea that is based on the competitiveness agenda and overlaps with that of sovereignty—but not beyond that. The logic of strategic independence is that of Security with a capital S: Europe cannot be in a state of existential vulnerability if, for any reason, it loses access to an external supplier or faces the threat of losing it. The defense, energy, and digital industries sectors would be the most problematic. Since not everything can be done simultaneously, several factors must be weighed when developing policies: the extreme consequences of the threat if it materializes, the probability of its materialization, the relative cost of taking deterrent measures versus alternative ones, and, finally, the cost of these alternatives. When calculating this, we must bear in mind that it is not exactly a matter of substitution, but rather of adopting alternatives—technological or related to the location of production—that have a similar effect at a cost we can afford. It is also necessary to distinguish between the availability of capacity—both physical and in terms of expertise—and current production levels. We build desalination plants as a contingency option during droughts, but naturally, we always prioritize the most economical supply, which will only occasionally be desalination. Similarly, to address severe supply disruptions—and to neutralize the potential of threats—what we need is the ability to quickly deploy a secure alternative.