"Spain will not allocate anything less than 2.1% of its gross domestic product [...] It makes no sense to commit to that 5%; it would be a waste of billions of euros that would not make us any safer.Pedro Sánchez
"Mr. President, beloved Donald. [...] You are soaring toward another great success in The Hague this afternoon. It hasn't been easy, but everyone has signed the 5% [...] You will achieve something no other president in decades has been able to do. Europe will pay big, as it should, and it will be a victory for you."
Mark Rutte
Last week, Pedro Sánchez stated that Spain was withdrawing from the NATO agreement to allocate up to 5% of GDP to defense, as Donald Trump demands of allied countries. Sánchez's reasons are twofold: such a proportion is unnecessary and would be "incompatible with Spain's welfare state." The second doesn't require much explanation, because what is allocated to defense cannot be allocated to healthcare; the first, however, does require some discussion.
If we talk about strengthening NATO—an entity recently considered "brain dead" due to a lack of purpose—it is because we believe that, after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia represents a threat to some Eastern European countries, particularly the Baltic republics, Poland, and Finland. We are far away, no doubt, but we are obliged to participate in their security for legal reasons (we are members of NATO) and moral reasons (we are Europeans and we want Europe to preserve certain values, which are less scarce here than anywhere else). Now, how much is necessary to stop Russia?
Russia has 146 million inhabitants, and "Europe"—the European Union plus the United Kingdom—has 518 million. Russia has a GDP of 2.2 trillion euros, and we have 23. The disproportion is, therefore, enormous. Even if we count Russia's GDP in terms of purchasing power, Europe's is still 4.5 times higher. Therefore, if "Europe" were to dedicate 2% to defense and do so efficiently, Russia would have to dedicate 9% to it to equal us. In the event of war, countries can far exceed this proportion, but maintaining it persistently during peacetime is not sustainable.
So Sánchez is right: 2.1% of GDP is enough for the "Europeans" to contain Russian expansionism. Even without help from the US, which could focus exclusively on what interests them: the Pacific.
The challenge—as Sánchez himself said—is another: to do so efficiently, which requires coordination, starting with the unification of weapons models and their deployment. The challenge, therefore, is not financial, but political—ceding military sovereignty—and industrial—ceding sovereignty in public procurement. This is Europe's true military challenge, and increasing spending could well mean cutting public services without substantially improving security.
However, NATO has agreed to raise the target to 5%, as Donald Trump demanded, after Secretary General Mark Rutte sent a shameful message that can only be described as lame.
How can it be that Rutte, who as Prime Minister of the Netherlands had been the leader of "frugal" Europe and the scourge of the "embezzled" Mediterranean countries, has become the flatterer of Donald Trump, who intends to increase European military spending by 2.5?
I don't think Rutte is a fan of Trump. Everything about him suggests that he must internally despise a figure like him. The most likely explanation to me is that Rutte has come to the conclusion that Europe needs a capricious figure like Trump not to abandon Ukraine to Putin's fate, that he has no shortage of desire to do so, and that the only arguments he listens to are those of those who flatter him (Netanyahu has enlisted his support here).
Rutte knows that the 5% agreement is neither firm nor immediate. Let's remember that the 2% of GDP target was set in 2014, and that ten years later, eight member countries of the alliance—out of a total of 31—have still not reached it; let's also remember that 1.5% can be achieved effortlessly through accounting tricks. On the other hand, the withdrawal of US support for Ukraine could be immediate, and with devastating effects.
I could be wrong, obviously, but I think Rutte has chosen the difficult path of lying. Difficult for him, an arrogant puritan who has flaunted austerity and candor in both public and private affairs. On the contrary, Sánchez, who surely wouldn't have such a hard time lying, has chosen the path of telling the truth because he could and because it was convenient for him to do so: his position won't move the United States and, instead, it will earn him dividends among his electorate.
