It definitely seems like we've entered a new world. Tougher, more practical, more realistic. The post-World War II world is abruptly coming to an end. The new US administration is the main driver of this change. Competence and security These are the renewed key words. This implies important changes not only in what happens, but also in how we think about what happens. This article focuses on the first aspect.
We are no longer in a time of contrast between the states of two opposing blocs, but rather in a time of contrast between three empires (the US, China, and Russia) and some more secondary actors (the EU, India, and Turkey, among others). And we know that the behavior of empires is not comparable to that of states. Empires are something else. From the first known empire, that of the Akkadians at the end of the third millennium BC (Sargo I), through the Assyrians, Persians, Romans, Parthians, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, etc., until reaching the great game In the 19th century, between Russia and Great Britain for Asian hegemony, in the two world wars plus the Cold War and the Chinese resurgence of the last decades of the 20th century, the political, economic, military and territorial interests of the empires, when they exist, prevail over those of the rest of the actors.
In fact, the American administration is correcting the miscalculations made by previous administrations since the 1990s, when, after the US won the Cold War in the USSR, it believed itself strong enough to win the postwar period as well (NATO expansion, etc.). The collapse of the USSR and a greatly weakened Russia led by Yeltsin seemed to support this. Under Putin, things changed. For a few years (early 21st century), Putin tried to approach the West on more cooperative than competitive terms, but the Western strategy contemptuously shut the door on him. After warning him more than once or twice, the Russian reaction came in 2014 in the form of the invasion of Crimea and subsequently the pro-Russian Ukrainian territories of the Donbas.
However, the ensuing war (2022) has shown how Russia's renewed megalomania for imperial recovery was not proportional to its actual military capabilities. This came as a surprise. Ukrainian resilience, with Western help, has been admirable. It still is. However, the Trump administration has changed the rules of the game, suddenly sidelining the European Union and shaking up the playing field of global geopolitics.
Contrary to what is being published, I believe, more cheerfully than accurately, that Ukraine is not comparable to the Sudetenland of 1938 (Hitler-Chamberlain-Daladier), nor does it seem that Ukraine runs the risk of becoming a new Belarus. Today, everything is much more intertwined internationally.
Viewed from a historical perspective, we know that for effective political unification to occur, two prior integrations are necessary: economic integration and military integration. In many cases, these have been forced integrations, based more on coercion than consensus. This logic underlies the formation of modern states or the unification processes of Germany, Italy, and so on.
NATO is today a weakened actor: it is enough to compare the declarations of thousand men of the last two general secretaries, Stoltenberg and Rutte – the latter's just a month ago – and his statements a few days ago, once Trump distanced himself from European defense.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, democracies and the horizon of human rights have receded. This is another pendulum. Generally speaking, ethics plays a secondary role in the international politics of empires. After the moralistic but ineffective goodwill of the League of Nations in the turbulent interwar period, the United Nations was forged. However, in the middle of it all, there was the worst war humanity has ever known. This is the world that has suddenly become old.
In practical terms, Ukraine's current situation calls for ensuring its security and sovereignty, but not its territoriality. Some European leaders seem to have failed to fully grasp the depth of the change taking place. For example, the so-called peace plan presented by Macron and other leaders, which includes the presence of Western troops in Ukraine, shows an angelic naivety that I believe would never have occurred to de Gaulle, even in terms of strategic negotiation.
The EU has suddenly been exposed to its own practical limitations. When the convenient American umbrella suddenly closes, the EU is left with a face of nothing planned under the inclement rain and winds over which it has no control, not even the forecast. However, it seems that new musical agreements are beginning to sound, new harmonies initiated with the German decision to allow debt for defense and infrastructure spending. It is the music of what could be the "Symphony for a New Europe" –once again a "symphony of a new world"– that encourages the EU to become an actor in all areas (political, economic, and military) in the medium term, strengthening itself internally and establishing a truly autonomous foreign policy based on the interested states (not the 27).
In philosophical terms, we can currently say that the international world is shifting from a comfortable but ineffective Kantian perspective to a more realistic Hegelian perspective. And this has to do with how we think about politics. But this is best left for another article.
