Is Europe at war?
In two conversations held over the last three weeks, two well-informed people with analytical capacity have agreed in telling me that we are in a third world war of a hybrid nature. The first was a conservative political scientist, the Canadian Michael Ignatieff; the other, a Minister of Defense of a EU country. We published the first conversation in ARA and the second is part of an off-the-record with someone with an extraordinary level of information about what is happening in Eastern Europe. The statement is, without a doubt, terrifying, which is why it is essential to see where we are and what we can do to not contribute to continuing to dig the grave.
To begin with, let us review what these aggressions against Europe are that justify the words of the two interlocutors, who coincide in pointing to Russia as the provocateur. Beyond the direct aggression against Ukraine, grey gestures of harassment against Europe are multiplying: a series of sabotages and attacks that by themselves do not justify a NATO response but that demand an alert re-reading of the situation.
1. Poland, November 2025. An explosion destroyed a section of the Warsaw-Lublin train line, near Mika, an essential infrastructure for transporting supplies to Ukraine. The perpetrators also tampered with the track and damaged electrical installations. The sabotage endangered a train with 475 passengers. The Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, identified two Ukrainian citizens who, according to Polish services, were acting on behalf of Russian intelligence and who fled to Belarus.
2. Germany, night of August 4-5, 2026. A drone loaded with explosives entered the Leipzig/Halle airport and impacted against the wing of an Antonov plane dedicated to transporting material for Ukraine. It did not detonate. Investigators later located other devices with explosive charges in the vicinity of the airport. On September 1, the German Interior Minister, Alexander Dobrindt, openly attributed the operation to Russia.
3. Estonia, August 15, 2026. Fire is set to the facilities of Milrem Robotics, in Tallinn, a company specialized in unmanned ground vehicles also used by Ukrainian forces. Estonia's security services attributed the operation to the Russian secret services.
4. Poland, September 2026. A fire destroyed the electrical system and the backup generator of a Starlink facility in central Poland. The communications provided by Musk's company are fundamental for Ukrainian military operations. Polish authorities attributed the incident to Russia.
There have also been investigated attacks without accredited Russian authorship, but with suspicion, such as the damage to submarine telecommunications cables or an attempted arson sabotage against a Starlink ground station near Vilnius. German authorities located, in mid-September, a drone with explosives near the Wunstorf air base, in Lower Saxony. Investigators suspect it could have targeted Bundeswehr aircraft. On October 21, Reuters reported that the German armed forces had raised the internal threat level for Russian sabotage to "significant". In both the Baltic countries and Hungary, there are dozens of provocative aerial operations carried out by Russian aircraft.
Using fear
In Poland, one of the European countries that knows the Russian threat best for historical and geographical reasons, fear is already part of political life. According to a survey by the IBRiS institute published in September, 68% of Poles fear an armed provocation from Moscow. In contrast, only 16% believe that the war in Ukraine will spread to their territory. The two data points, coming from different surveys, show a society that is not necessarily convinced that an open war will break out, but that has accepted the possibility of permanent aggression. It is the terrain in which hybrid warfare operates: a state of insecurity in which the border between peace and war is deliberately blurred.
The Polish press has identified the core of this strategy. In an article published in Rzeczpospolita, Marek Kutarba summarizes it with an eloquent title: "Russia has had enough of making us fear it". The thesis is: Putin does not need to invade Europe to start subduing it. It may be enough for him to get Europeans to make their decisions conditioned by the fear of Russia. Every act of sabotage, every drone incursion, and every threat seeks to demonstrate that Moscow has the capacity to alter European normality. The material destruction may be limited; the political effect being pursued is much more ambitious. The goal is not simply to intimidate, but to modify the decisions of governments and the behavior of societies. That helping Ukraine seems too dangerous. That strengthening European defense is interpreted as a provocation. That every new act of sabotage feeds the temptation to give in to avoid another one.
This is the paradox that European democracies face. They have an obligation to inform citizens of the risks, but they must also avoid letting intimidation achieve its main goal: paralyzing political will. The question is no longer just how many attacks Europe can withstand, but how many decisions it is willing to stop making for fear of provoking another one. The most profitable victory for the Kremlin would be a Europe that, without having been militarily defeated, began to act as if it had been.
Hybrid warfare does not necessarily seek to conquer territory, but rather to condition the adversary's freedom of decision. And this is its most dangerous dimension. A democracy can resist sabotage, repair a railway line, or replace a destroyed infrastructure. What is much more difficult to repair is the loss of confidence in one's own capacity. Russia does not need to win a war against Europe if it manages to make Europe renounce, out of fear, defending its interests.
