February 23rd and Suárez
On January 29, 1981, during a cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez resigned. "I am leaving without having been asked to [...] I am leaving so that this system of freedoms, for which I have suffered greatly [...], is not abruptly interrupted [...], but it has been worth it. If my sacrifice once served to build democracy, this one must serve to prevent its destruction." "I have lost the trust of the powers that be, I have lost the acceptance of the press, I have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the opposition, I have lost the credibility of a large part of our electorate, I have lost my own party [...]". The moment was solemn. The Minister of Defense, Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún, inappropriately requested the floor and announced the appointment of General Alfonso Armada as Deputy Chief of the Army Staff. Prime Minister Suárez glared at him.
"Mr. President, I know that a military posting is made by ministerial order and should not come from the council of ministers, but the king asked me to do this one!"
"Military appointments and postings," Suárez replied, "are decided by the government, not the king. And since the subject has come up, I want to make my disagreement clear." Then, looking at Rafael Arias-Salgado, who, as Minister of the Presidency, is responsible for recording the minutes of the Council of Ministers meetings, he added: "This appointment was made behind my back, without my consent and against my wishes, which I clearly express here."
On February 24, 1981, after the coup attempt, the Spanish National Defense Council was convened at 5:00 p.m. First, they listened to the detailed account given by Francisco Laína, Secretary of State for Security, of what had happened inside and outside the Congress building the previous day. The Council was chaired by the King, and those in attendance included Vice President Gutiérrez Mellado, the Ministers of the Interior and Defense, Rosón and Rodríguez Sahagún, and the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Lieutenant Generals Emiliano Alfaro Arregui, Ignacio Alfaro Arregui, and José Gab Pelluz. When Francisco Laína played the recording of the conversation between Tejero and García Carrés, in which the latter said that Armada went to the Congress because what he wanted was "a cushy job" and that "he could just as easily join a government with socialists and communists as a military junta that he would preside over," the King covered his face with his hands and rubbed his...
The general trend in the debate at Spain's National Defense Council was to find a way to avoid prosecuting the coup-plotting generals. President Suárez saw that he was losing the argument because "we have enough problems without trying high-ranking army officers now." Addressing Gabeiras, the Chief of the Army Staff, Suárez ordered the immediate dismissal of General Armada, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, "and tomorrow the Minister of Defense will decide whether or not to arrest him." "No, not Armada!" Gabeiras said, looking at the King. "Not Armada!" Suárez responded abruptly: "General Gabeiras, don't look at the King, look at me, I'm giving you an order!" President Suárez's firm stance led to the trial and imprisonment of the main actors in the coup, though not all of them. For this account, I have used references fromAnatomy of a Momentby Javier Cercas, andThe great amnesia, by Pilar Urbano.
There was a conflict between two rebellions: one underway, led by Tejero and Milans, which aimed to establish a military junta to govern Spain, and a more political one in the making, which sought a coalition government of all political forces—presided over by a general—to stabilize Spain, which was then suffering from rampant ETA terrorism, the beginnings of the "breakup of Spain" governments, and a profound economic crisis. The clash meant that neither rebellion succeeded. The suddenness of the military rebellion, with tanks rolling into the streets of Valencia, rendered Armada's more political, and also slower, coup attempt unfeasible. The resignation of President Suárez saved the State, leaving the coup plotters without an immediate enemy. President Suárez's words upon resigning ("I am leaving so that this system of freedoms, for which I have suffered greatly, will not be interrupted") proved prophetic. The King's disaffection with President Suárez was a decisive factor in his resignation.
The political responsibility for the coup lies with those who carried it out, but no less with all those who did not stop the processes when it was possible and encouraged and incited those who proposed simple solutions, which never solve anything.
This is a personal opinion, perhaps not shared by everyone, but the best Prime Minister of Spain in the 20th century was Suárez, both for what he did—his decisive role in bringing about democracy—and for what he prevented—the success of the coup. The State did not treat him as he deserved. In Spain, this is a recurring theme throughout history.
Things never go as planned, and we are still suffering the consequences of the coup. The LOAPA law, the law on harmonizing regional autonomy, the difficulties in implementing the Catalan Statute, and possibly the GAL death squads, were negative consequences, not only for Catalans, but for all Spaniards.