Trump has subjected Europe to two serious but conceptually separable shocks: trade (tariffs) and, in the wake of the war in Ukraine, the effective withdrawal of security guarantees. Both demand a response, but I believe the urgency is not the same. In the first case, the immediate response should be moderate. to the Sheinbaum (Mexico). Increasing European tariffs hurts American exporters, but also European importers. For now, it's better not to fuel the escalation and give time for an internal reaction in the US that will bring American trade policy back to a sense of purpose. However, if it doesn't, retaliation must be a viable option and, if necessary, forceful.
In contrast, in the second case, the urgency is great. Europe has a margin of just a few years to build a defense structure independent of the US and credible for Putin. It has time because Ukraine's resistance has inflicted considerable strain on a country, Russia, with a GDP lower than Italy's. It has been said that Putin lacks aggressive ambitions beyond Ukraine. An article (Sánchez-Cuenca in The Country) insisted that strengthening defenses would distract us from fighting the far right. I don't see why. It's the same fight today. Carney in Canada has revived the Liberal Party's hopes by combating the Trumpist contamination of the Conservative Party. Fisas, in the ARA, we recommend make an "interesting proposal" involving Russia's border states (neutrality? disarmament? Will we also demand this from Belarus?). My conviction is that Putin's threats will only keep us awake at night if the Russian president is faced with a defense that inspires his respect. Trump wants us to dedicate 5% of our GDP to this, with a good portion of it purchased from the US. If we ever did dedicate 5% to defense, it would be incredibly stupid not to be self-sufficient. But the situation is better: I agree with Miquel Puig that to contain Russia without depending on anyone, 2% should be enough, if things are done right and we get started immediately. Taking the risk of not doing so would be extremely reckless.
In the article from two weeks ago described a likely scenario for the construction of European defense. It was essentially von der Leyen's proposal: coordinated leadership between the United Kingdom and a core group of EU countries, a package of additional defense spending (€800 billion, for von der Leyen) of which 20% could be EU-funded and the rest by member states via whatever borrowing margin they can afford. Given Europe's fiscal realities, this means that the burden of "rearmament" would fall on Germany. I joked about the paradox that in Europe today, German rearmament doesn't frighten us. But reading an article by Habermas (The Country, last Sunday) makes me reflect beyond irony and conclude that the scenario described is unsatisfactory and may be dangerous. If there is to be a qualitative leap in defense, it would be neither economically efficient nor, above all, politically reasonable for a state, be it called Germany or France, to be responsible for and control the most powerful military force in Europe. Past and present experience in Europe and the US tells us that democratic processes are not immune to electing autocratic governments. If we must arm ourselves, we need checks and balances (checks and balances).
In my opinion, a better scenario would be the following: the EU defense program is financed by an issue of EU debt, as with the Next Generation funds. The investment of these funds is determined and managed by the Commission—coordinated with the United Kingdom—which thus gains strength to promote structures oriented toward external defense and not repetitive. Now, the investment—and the corresponding creation of jobs of all kinds—should be dispersed throughout Europe. For three reasons: security, sharing the economic benefits, and establishing a situation of total interdependence between Member States on the ground.
Unfortunately, this will not happen. The Commission is too weak to lead defense. This is so for various reasons, but one key is the unanimity rule. The possibility that an Orbán could end up being a decisive factor in how the new European defense is built—he could be responsible, for example, for the fact that the cost isn't shared, and therefore it isn't a truly European enterprise—is unacceptable. The EU is learning to do without Hungary. But it's doing so by weakening the Commission. It shouldn't be this way.
