Europe, Vichy capital?

The short-term evolution – a year? – of the transatlantic relationship is uncertain. Whether we look from Europe – today, Sunday, we will see whether the German elections give hope for the formation of a minimally strong European leadership – or from the US, which, I think, will be the most decisive factor. In an optimistic mood, I do not exclude that Trumpism, American or European, will begin to fall victim to its contradictions.

But whatever happens, there is no turning back. Whatever happens, Europe now knows that Trumpism is possible in the US, and that this will have a permanent impact. I describe three features that are already imaginable, but not certain, of a European reaction.

1- Principles. The face that Europe will want to show to the world will be one that emphasises the values associated with, on the one hand, the social policies of the welfare state and, on the other, human rights, freedoms and democracy. There are dictatorships that practice social policies but do not respect rights or freedoms. And there are authoritarian movements, such as Trumpism, that do not respect democracy (Trump claims to have won the 2020 elections), but which, if through political and economic means they can guarantee themselves great influence over the media, boast of respecting freedom of expression. That is why Europe must be very strict in identifying itself with all values. This is compatible with updating social policies, but perhaps not with, for example, insisting on the illegalisation of "hate". If, following Abascal's visit to Washington, I write "Mr. Abascal is a useful idiot for Trump", I would prefer not to be able to be prosecuted, if not today, then tomorrow.

2- Understandings. In the complex world of geopolitics, shocks lead to distancing and rapprochement. I think it is inevitable that the distancing between the US and Europe induced by Trump will open a period of rapprochement between Europe and China. There are economic reasons – each is interested in the other's market – but there are also political reasons. Trump is interested in separating Russia from China in order to weaken China. Europe is interested in separating China from Russia in order to weaken Russia. The impact on EU-US relations will depend greatly on the relative success of both operations. Surely the second can achieve, at least, Chinese moderation on the Ukraine issue. I think the first could end in nothing: Trump may demand too much.

3- Security. Let us be clear: Europe must arm itself. If, as appears to be the case, the welcome peace that is coming is in fact a Russian victory, there may be a pause, but there is no reason to think that Putin will not try to exploit the manifest vulnerability of those who have been unable to defend Ukraine. His ambitions do not end with Ukraine, especially since, if Europe does not increase its defensive military capacity, threats are likely to be enough to get results. To consider military equality with Russia is not warmongering. It is true – if we forget about third parties – that if both Europe and Russia are armed at a balanced level of 100, both would prefer to save and settle on a common level of 50. But it does not follow that if Russia is at 100 and Europe at 50, Russia has an incentive to reduce military spending. In any case, it would do so after prevailing against a militarily weak Europe. Conclusion: first military parity, then disarmament negotiations.

Now, if Europe spends more on defense, it should not do so by buying American equipment. We would still be dependent. Technology and manufacturing should be European. I suspect that this option would enjoy more citizen support than the alternative of buying in the US. But American pressure will be enormous and not everyone will be able to resist it initially.

I conclude with two facts about additional spending that, because of management and regulation, are better not to ignore. The first is that –even though part of this spending will be inherently dual (cybersecurity, technological research...)– it will conflict with the ability to meet new needs in the pillars of the welfare state –for Spain, in both cases, let's talk about GDP points–. The second is that it will boost our own industrial-military complex, which will also be territorial, because most likely, precisely to guarantee support, manufacturing will be dispersed throughout Europe.

Without a doubt, it would be better if Russia were just another European democratic state. But it is not. In the meantime, what should we do? Sleep waiting for the capital of Europe to be Vichy?