Does the EU want to crush fascism?

New order are very strong words, but they have been here for days now. They were also used by the Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, when he took to the podium of the European Parliament to speak about the new alliance between Canada and the EU. New order means, in short, turning the page on what was designed after the Second World War and giving way to something new. The villain is no longer Germany, and the old allies are no longer allies. It is necessary to know, therefore, who the new enemies are and who the new allies are for the coming decades. And, above all, why. Enemies must be chosen both internally (are the new nationalist waves one? Or are they just a symptom of the system's failure, which needs to be perfected?) and externally (two blocs: the United States against the BRICS). Carney, who had already spoken months ago in Davos about the need to build "variable geometry" coalitions between middle powers, has found a natural partner in the European Union. And in fact the EU, for the first time in decades, has something it was missing to cohere: a clear external enemy. Or more than one, rather. Europe has been trying to atone for Nazism since 1945. It was invited to shape a new order that has worked quite well for almost 80 years, but it has always been heavily conditioned by the United States, especially under the pretext of the Cold War. Now Russia is no longer communist, and therefore could have been a European ally, but it has preferred to embrace China (in a quite incomprehensible way, since the pre-Soviet culture and traditional values are liberal and Western: it is only understood, therefore, as a response to the humiliation suffered after the fall of the Wall). We are no longer talking about opposing social systems, but about clashing geopolitical influence blocs: a race to see who advances most in AI, to reach Mars, or to develop the latest and most sophisticated lethal weapon. In this race, our old American "big brother" is no longer coming to save or protect us. In fact, the old American ally against the Nazis now seems the most authoritarian of all.

Euroscepticism is a phenomenon that is understandable. The commercial and political aggression of Donald Trump and the constant military threat of Vladimir Putin (with whom we are at war) cannot be combated without the EU also looking inward. A bloc founded on the rule of law, plural democracy, and human rights is a beautiful and attractive idea for allies like Canada, but it must prove to be efficient and effective (and address pending debates with courage). The greater the geopolitical challenge becomes, the more evident the obsolescence of European institutions proves to be. The decision-making system by unanimity, designed for a Community of six members, creaks loudly now that there are twenty-seven. The Commission continues to be, in the eyes of the majority of citizens, a distant and technocratic body, the stuff of enlightened (or unenlightened) despots. The EU does not lack economic muscle or industrial capacity, but rather a sense of perceived legitimacy. In Catalonia, for obvious reasons, even more so: it is very unsettling to see the Polish prime minister, so alarmed by Russian drones, and to recognize in him the face of our unforgettable “intermediary” Donald Tusk. It is necessary to rethink who has their own voice within the European project. No, it is not just about recognizing Catalan as an official language: it is about ceasing to ignore the nations that make up Europe and their rights. The horizon of a future incorporation of Wales or Scotland, should they democratically decide to follow their own paths outside of the United Kingdom, should lead to abandoning the European diplomatic taboo regarding self-determination. A Union that aspires to be a refuge for liberal democracy cannot look the other way when old European peoples express, through peaceful and legal means, their will to integrate into it sovereignly. At the end of the Second World War, we were trapped in another postwar period. And where were we at its beginning? We were in an “Iberian world war”, between republican and fascist sides, largely a successor to the UDI of Francesc Macià in 1931. If Europe is now moving along the same two axes, I am clear about which one is mine. However: to crush fascism, we use the espadrille. If we help with one thing, we want a counterpart in the other. Speaking Catalan in Europe, gentlemen, we already do. We want something else, and luckily it has to do with what Europe precisely must do: decide its own future.