China, the 'Trump revolution' and the Global South

In the international landscape in which we find ourselves after the recent Trump revolutionThere are two global factors that deserve attention: China and the so-called Global South.

ChinaA few weeks ago, the Document on China's policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean (December 2025) from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a relevant text, especially after the US intervention in Venezuela. It is not a response to the aforementioned and discussed document from the US administration. National security strategy (November 2025), but it makes clear the objectives and styles of the Chinese government (I am using the translation published by the Observatory of Chinese Politics).

A primary contrast between the American and Chinese documents lies in their language. While the Trump administration's document speaks of its objectives without abstract rhetoric or complexities, blurring the lines between public and private spheres, the Chinese document uses more conciliatory terms, referring to "an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization." The proclaimed values revolve around development based on sovereignty (non-interference), cooperation, peaceful coexistence, and mutual benefit among parties presented as equals. The document outlines five action programs (which I will not detail): solidarity, development, civilizations, peace, and peoples.

However, it's easy to see in this document a more restrained but clear tone of imperial nationalism, which aligns it with the US document. From the outset, it states that it is assumed that the Latin American interlocutors accept "the one-China principle," that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory," and that they support the reunification of China. Subsequently, the document reflects a clear asymmetry in the "equal" bilateral relations of these states with China, which is always the dominant actor. Latin American states are invited to participate in the institutions and policies already being implemented by the Chinese authorities. Finally, the document defends institutions, "international law," and the peaceful settlement of disputes, including "the arms trade and cooperation in military technology." It is a document worth examining, and doing so against the complex but highly relevant backdrop of the Global South.

Global SouthAnother useful document to read is the report Fulcrums of Order. Rising States and The Struggle for The Future, of the think tank American Center for Strategic & International Studies (Washington, December 2025). The heart of the report is the analysis of eight "swing states" that are regional leaders: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates.

Although the perspective adopted is that of US security, it establishes a complex interplay of light and shadow that these Global South states may play in the coming years. In most cases, these states have more trade relations with China than with the United States, but in fact, they are playing several games at once—including with the US—depending on their interests and in all areas, including technology and energy—both fossil fuels, green energy, and the "revived" nuclear energy sector.

These are states interested in building international institutions, starting with the UN, that are more inclusive and overcome the post-World War II international logic (changes that could also benefit the losers of the war, mainly Germany and Japan).

It's important to remember that while OECD countries accounted for 80% of global GDP in 1990, it's now projected that they will represent only 40% by 2030 (the rest of the world will account for 60%). This presents a mutual opportunity for both the Global South and the US and China. The key concepts of this challenge are development, investment, trade, and networks of political and cultural influence.

It seems clear that the global struggle for hegemony today revolves around the United States and China. 70% of the world's countries now trade more with China than with the US. In fact, we know that China invested $679 billion in nearly 150 countries between 2012 and 2023 through the Belt and Road Initiative (loans are estimated at between $1.1 and $1.5 trillion, as Rajah-Albayrak indicates in [reference missing]). China Versus America on Global Trade, Lowy Institute (January 2025).

However, US-China relations are not simply competitive. Both countries are interested, in principle, in a predictable, stable world based on free trade and the most peaceful coexistence possible. But this mutual interest inevitably coexists with the struggle for hegemony in the technological and energy sectors, as well as for territorial spheres of influence that will not tolerate interference from the rival. I believe the Trump administration's decisions can be framed within the tension between these three fronts. In any case, the role of "swing states," their agreements, alliances, and strategies constitute a factor to watch going forward to understand future international developments.

With recent US actions in Venezuela, China has lost ground in Latin America and the Caribbean. And the United States has strengthened its role and that of the dollar in international trade. What might China's reaction be? According to renowned sinologists like Xulio Ríos, China is not currently prepared for a military confrontation with the US.

These are times of change. And we Europeans, basically, are watching.