Michael Sandel: "Globalization has created the inequalities that have brought us figures like Trump."
Professor of Political Science at Harvard University and co-author of the book "Equality: What It Means and Why It Matters"
BarcelonaMichael Sandel (Minneapolis, 1953) is one of the most renowned academics in the study of economic inequalities, their roots and their social, cultural and political consequences. With a slow-paced but forceful argument, Sandel addresses theCompanies at the Hotel Casa Fuster in Barcelona to talk aboutEquality, what it means and why it matters (Edicions 62, translated into Catalan by Imma Estany), a book that puts on paper a conversation between him and the French economist Thomas Piketty –another of the world's leading figures in the field of economicsstudy of equality–, in which they reflect on what to do to achieve societies and a world in which wealth and social justice are more balanced.
One of the elements that stands out in the book when it talks about inequality is that it's closely related to concepts like dignity and respect. What does this mean? How do these two concepts influence the far right?
— One of the most corrosive effects of the rising inequality of recent decades has been its impact on dignity and recognition in our societies. Neoliberal globalization has created inequalities of income and wealth, but attitudes toward the concept of success have shifted, creating a divide between winners and losers. This divide breeds hatred and resentment among many working-class people, who feel that more educated people look down on them. And this resentment fuels the rise of the far right against elites and establishment political parties.
This phenomenon seems to be different from inequality, for example, in the 19th century, when there was a sense of working-class pride that we don't see today. What has changed? What solutions exist?
— It is necessary to change the foundations of political discourse to focus it more directly on the dignity of work. In recent decades, social democratic discourse has focused primarily on redistribution and justice, leaving the welfare state as the sole focus, however important that may be. But it has ignored the dignity of work. We need a new political agenda that asks how it is possible to affirm, renew, and strengthen the dignity of work for everyone who contributes to the economy and the common good, and not just for those with higher education. We must pay attention to workers without university degrees, because they make important contributions that deserve recognition and that have been ignored.
You mentioned neoliberal globalization. Do you think there's been a shift among experts since the 2008 financial crash regarding the negative consequences of globalization? Even economists like Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, who were strong supporters of globalization, now admit that it has had a negative impact on many people.
— There are a number of reasons. Many doctrinaire economists led the defense of globalization, including not only those on the right, but also those on the center-left. These were the economists who in the U.S. saw globalization as the problem and markets as the solution. But the turning point came when they were succeeded by center-left politicians, such as Clinton in the U.S., Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, and Gerhard Schröder in Germany, who smoothed out the rough edges of pure economic policies. laissez-faireBut they never questioned its fundamental premise: that markets are essential instruments for achieving the public good. It was the center-left parties, along with the center-right parties, that promoted the hyperglobalization and deregulation that brought about the financial crisis.
How did the 2008 crisis influence the post-2008 world?
— When the crisis came, those same economists and parties mainstreamInstead of restructuring the relationship between the financial world and the economy, they bailed out Wall Street. This, returning to the initial question, created outrage and resentment across the political spectrum. On the left, we remember the Occupy Wall Street movement and the astonishing strength of Bernie Sanders's candidacy in 2016, and on the right, the Tea Party and the election of Donald Trump. So now, finally, many economists and establishment parties are beginning to recognize that neoliberal globalization not only created the crisis, but also the growing inequalities that have led to a divide between winners and losers that has brought us figures like Trump in the US and, in Europe, far-right parties.
As you said, there's not only the far right, but there's also been a left-wing response to this growing inequality. Sanders, obviously, but in Spain we saw the rise of Podemos and the Indignados; in Italy, the Five Star Movement, and so on. In Catalonia—as in Scotland—we had a less common phenomenon: the rise of the independence movement, which is often described as a popular movement led by the middle and working classes. Do you also see this as a response to the problems arising from globalization, or are there other reasons more closely related to the country's domestic politics?
— I think there are overlapping trends. One of the assumptions of neoliberal globalization, which has lasted four or five decades, is that national borders and identities should eventually be overcome in favor of the free movement of capital, goods, and people across borders. This disregard for identities has generated a response that has taken many forms. We now realize what we've always known: people want to identify with specific places, cultures, and traditions, and this triumphalist faith in the market misses an important element.
In the book he argues with Piketty about the word populism: he doesn't like it.
— He doesn't like it.
Do you agree? Because for Europeans, it's a very American word that we associate with the far right.
— When I come to Europe I should try to use another word. The same goes for the word liberal, which in the US means center-left, while in Europe it means neoliberalIt's not that we disagreed with Thomas; it's more a different usage in the US context, where there's a long populist tradition that has both right- and left-wing dimensions and dates back to the 19th century, to an alliance of workers and farmers against the concentration of power in large corporations, railroads, and banks. That was called the populist movement, which had a more egalitarian ambition and opposed the oligarchy. It's from that tradition that Sanders emerges, and that's why it's a useful term in the North American context, but not in the European one. In 2016, a significant number of voters had Sanders as their first or second choice, but when he lost the Democratic nomination to Hillary Clinton, they switched to Trump.
He talks about Sanders as a populist politician, but he defines himself as a social democrat, which is a very European concept.
— Their ideas are social democratic. In the North American context, one often sees many leftist views, although in Europe they would be mainstreamRegarding populism, if we think about it, there are two branches of left-wing politics, both in the US and in Europe. One seeks a high degree of redistribution in a more general welfare state, with universal healthcare, something we struggle to achieve in the US and that many European countries do have. The other is anti-oligarchy, anti-monopoly, giving the population a greater voice. This connects with another concept, republicanism, which contrasts with the liberal tradition. It's important to keep these two currents within the left in mind. Social democracy describes the first, while the second... what would be the term in Europe? In France, they also talk about republicanism.
Also in Spain and Catalonia.
— I've encouraged Democrats in the US and social democrats in Europe to better articulate this second branch without excluding the first, because I don't believe the first is sufficient in Europe. It won't be enough to confront Trump-style populism and inspire a large number of voters who today feel disempowered and ignored.
In the book, you talk about elite universities in the US, where there is a much greater overrepresentation of students from wealthy families than in European universities. As a European, it's one of those cases that happens to us, like with the US healthcare system: we ask ourselves, "Why don't they fix it?" All advanced countries have found solutions except the United States, which is a very rich and democratic country. Why can't the US implement welfare state policies like those in Europe?
— For two reasons. The first is the enormous power of the private healthcare industry. It makes enormous amounts of money under the current system, even though it's less efficient than European healthcare. But free-market individualism also comes into play, which is intrinsic to US public culture and makes solidarity very difficult. Creating a universal healthcare system requires certain basic notions of solidarity and responsibility toward others. European countries draw on several traditions that make solidarity more compelling. It's difficult for Americans, but it's a fight we must continue.
Is it more of a social problem than a political one?
— It's social, cultural, and has to do with the political tradition of the United States. The idea of freedom that drives the American political tradition is more individualistic. The ability to do what I want without government control, including not having to pay for someone else's healthcare. There's this American idea of freedom that, on the one hand, promotes innovation and risk-taking, but, on the other, is an obstacle to the kind of solidarity necessary to pursue the common good. I've long criticized the excesses of the American conception of individualism, arguing that it's flawed. Being free isn't just doing what I want without state interference; it's sharing self-government, deliberating with other citizens on common matters.
What are the roots of this American individualism? Because the founding of the United States has an egalitarian component: the Declaration of Independence states that "all men are created equal."
— That's true in the Declaration, but if you read the whole passage, which [second U.S. President] Thomas Jefferson wrote, it says, "All men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." The traditional American way of interpreting this phrase is that we are all created equal, but not in the sense that we are bound to one another and that our own good can only be achieved through the pursuit of the good of all. That would be a sympathetic interpretation. The liberal interpretation is that we are all given an equal right to pursue our own happiness and good, according to our own definition.
In both the book and previous works, he refers to meritocracy as something negative. It's an idea that doesn't seem very popular these days, especially among wealthier people.
— Meritocracy is good if it involves the most qualified people playing socially important roles. That is, if I have to have surgery, I want a well-qualified doctor to do it. In this sense, it's a good thing, but it has come to mean something else, which is the idea that those who are successful deserve all the rewards because they have worked hard and exercised their talents. Thus, those who have finished at the top during this period of globalization have come to believe that their success depends only on them and, therefore, they deserve the spoils awarded to them by the market. And, by extension, they also think that those who struggle haven't worked hard enough and therefore deserve them. This way of thinking stems from an a priori attractive ideal, that of meritocracy, which says that if everyone has the same opportunities, then winners deserve their rewards. Current inequalities can be criticized from two points of view: one can say that they show that in reality not everyone has the same opportunities, but that, if they did, then winners would deserve their success. Or it could be argued that this ideal is flawed and corrosive of the common good, as it fosters arrogance among the winners and humiliation among those left behind. It leads people to forget their good fortune and what they owe to those who made their achievements possible.