Viktor Orbán, on the way to the end

It could be said that Viktor Orbán, the designer of the most convoluted illiberal and authoritarian trenches—both Putinist and Trumpist—within the European Union, is beginning to crumble, to fade away. The polls show that he is the most likely candidate. In his party, the far-right Fidesz, the lowest level of support in the last ten years: a 36% voting intention.

This is mainly due to the emergence of Tisza, a liberal conservative party that currently has 41% support and that presents itself as a defender of respect and freedom; in other words, it defends all the values that Orbán has eroded in his fifteen years of relentless power. In some ways, Tisza's unexpected rise is reminiscent of the dizzying speed with which Viktor Orbán rose to power in 2010, shattering what remained of the conservative right and the social democratic left that had spearheaded the transition from communism to democracy in 1989. Orbán had already made his appearance, but he remained on the threshold of being taken into account in the first democratic elections of 1990, which I attended as a reporter. The 8.95% that Orbán obtained, almost half a million votes, was analyzed in depth by the best Hungarian political scientists, and many risked saying that this man, still young, who always hid the fact that he could have been a member of the Communist Party, and who presented himself as an admirer of Margaret Thatcher, had a future: that he had no future at all. And in 1998, Viktor Orbán came to power for the first time, but in 2002, the Social Democrats won, and he would have to wait until 2010 to assault the Hungarian institutions: the combined support of Fidesz and the Jobbik extremists gave Orbán 56%. Enough strength to uproot the fragile democracy and mutate the institutions toward whose illiberalism Orbán boasts, and which at times recall the authoritarian governments of Miklós Horthy and the Arrow Cross Party, allies of the Nazis.

A disorganized left

Viktor Orbán seems to be fading away, while the conservative right-wing Tizsa party could take over, allowing immigrants and LGBTI people at least a moment to breathe. And the question is: what will happen on the left flank of Hungarian politics? In the 2022 elections, a bizarre, rather than eclectic, coalition ran, made up of the remnants of the Socialist Party (formerly communist), the Liberals, the Greens, and, beware, also the Jobbik extremists—who had collaborated with Orbán in the first stage, only to ask him to do so again—which now invites them to return, when it comes to choosing partners. Not everything goes, and not everything works. Especially for the Hungarian left, which is experiencing a moment of recomposition. After the success of the large LGBTI demonstration on June 28 in Budapest, which consolidated the position of mayor, the environmentalist Gergely Karácsony, and represented a major defeat for Orbán, who failed to follow through on the threat of violence, arrests, and imprisonment.

Which of the following could be a challenge for Viktor Orbán to gain ground and support and avoid losing the 2026 elections? For now, despise the European Union and flatter the United States for imposing 15% tariffs on him, without considering that it will also affect him. But he doesn't care. He will continue to support Putin, thanking him for the gas and oil in exchange for proclaiming, whenever necessary, that Ukraine will not win the war. In the coming months, Orbán will try to take full advantage of his partners Trump and Putin, even if he has to overlook the clashes that arise between the two despots.