Two years after the Wagner riot: Should Putin fear a new Prigokhin?

MoscowWhen June 23, 2023 Evgeny Prigokhin rebelled and headed for Moscow At the head of the Wagner Group mercenaries, Vladimir Putin had already arrived too late to prevent this. Prigokhin died very conveniently in a plane crash., Putin completed the process begun weeks earlier by expelling Wagner from Russia and Ukraine, and inviting the paramilitaries to serve under the command of the Russian army.

But fear that a new, charismatic and powerful commander could once again confront Putin had taken hold in the Kremlin. The first victim was one of the army's most promising generals, Sergei Surovikin, exiled to Algeria for his proximity to Prigokhin. The second, Igor Girkin, leader of the separatist forces in Donbas in 2014 and guilty of shooting down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, which killed 298 people, was sentenced to four years in prison for questioning the Russian president's ability to win the war in Ukraine. And the third, General Ivan Popov, an officer very popular with the troops and who had complained about the lack of supplies on the Zaporizhia front. Like Girkin, he ended up sentenced to five and a half years in prison on charges of embezzlement that were never proven.

According to experts, Prigokhin's trauma makes a new revolt within the armed forces or on its fringes highly unlikely. "The Russian authorities do not repeat these mistakes and, therefore, will not allow the emergence of an active, wealthy, and independent person with his own army," Russian historian Konstantin Pahaliuk tells ARA.

However, Putin could be tempted to facilitate the emergence of new paramilitary groups that act with the efficiency and brutality that regular military personnel are incapable of. According to political strategy specialist and social psychologist Aleskei Rosxin, Prigokhin was a creation of the Russian president, allowing him to fight "without the pressure of the stupidity of the army or its bureaucracy." Rosxin points out that, after the expulsion of the mercenary group from UkraineRussian troops have not achieved any significant success. This, he says, is where the idea of promoting a "Wagner 2, with the same inherent problems and dangers for Putin," could emerge.

"Mini-Prigojins" in Africa

While in Russia and on the Ukrainian front the Kremlin's iron grip is decapitating any potentially disruptive personality, it's a different story in Africa. After the Prigokhin mutiny, Putin ordered that on that continent, where Wagner had made a name for himself among private security companies, his mercenaries be integrated into the Africa Corps, a paramilitary group with a Nazi-like name, which operates at the behest of the Russian government.

However, Wagner continues to operate in countries such as the Central African Republic and, until a few days ago, in Mali. In an article inResponsible StatecraftJohn Lechner and Sergei Eledinov, two of the world's leading experts on Wagner, warn that, although the creation of Africa Corps was designed precisely to prevent the rise of another Prigokhin, Russia will not be able to sustain its military presence in Africa without inflows of private capital. This, they argue, will encourage the arrival of "new mini-Prigokhins," "patriotic and entrepreneurial oligarchs" attracted by the continent's growing geopolitical importance and the security needs of local governments.

Africa could be the destination for many of the veterans who return from Ukraine, inflamed with patriotic rhetoric and unable to readjust to civilian life in peacetime. Putin's suspicion of ultranationalist sectors has been a constant since the beginning of the invasion. During the first year, he saw the rise of dozens of war bloggers, many of them combatants, who questioned his military strategy and demanded greater forcefulness against Zelensky. The Kremlin's response was to co-opt the most moderate and silence the most radical, some of whom were murdered in unclear circumstances.

"Putin doesn't fear ultranationalists," says Rosxin, "the FSB (the former KGB) has been working specifically against them for years, identifying any leader and imprisoning them instantly." None of the analysts even believe that this sector could currently influence an eventual decision by the Russian president to end the war. "For them, any agreement is synonymous with betrayal, but they have no influence whatsoever," Pahaliuk believes. In his view, the threat to Putin isn't a coup by ultra-patriotic groups, but rather the social discontent and "systemic institutional conflict" these veterans could cause when they return home.