Who are the Druze and how have they managed to maintain autonomy within Syria?

BeirutSyrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced Thursday the withdrawal of security forces from Suwayda, in the south of the country, and the transfer of responsibility for public order to "local factions and wise sheikhs." The measure, presented as a gesture of containment to avoid "an open war" with Israel, actually represents a forced withdrawal, following days of sectarian clashes, a failed army deployment, and growing international pressure.

Since the outbreak of sectarian violence last weekend, Suwayda has been the scene of intense clashes between Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze fighters., triggered by the kidnapping and torture of a Druze merchant at a makeshift checkpoint. In an attempt to contain the violence, the government sent troops to the area on Tuesday, but their actions only aggravated tensions. Government forces were accused by local actors of collaborating with Sunni militias, which precipitated their withdrawal after a fragile ceasefire was reached on Wednesday night and the Intense Israeli bombing of military installations in Damascus.

According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, fighting has left 516 dead since Sunday, including at least 27 civilians. The speed with which Damascus has been forced to retreat confirms what many in Suwayda had already taken for granted: the link between the central state and this region has been severed.

The Druze community, an ambivalent relationship with power

To understand the background, it is necessary to look at Suwayda beyond this specific episode. A province with a Druze majority, it has historically maintained a ambivalent relationship with central power. The Druze community, a religious minority with Ismaili roots and a strongly hierarchical structure, never embraced armed rebellion against Bashar al-Assad's regime, but neither did it fully integrate into the state security apparatus. After the fall of the old regime, this distance was consolidated in the form of practical autonomy.

Before the civil war, the Druze numbered around 700,000 in Syria, the majority in the Suwayda region. Despite their small number, they have maintained significant influence thanks to their internal networks, a cohesive religious leadership—such as that of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri—and cross-border ties with communities in Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. For years, Suwayda was perceived as a "stable island" amidst the Syrian chaos, ruled de facto by local councils and traditional clans

The interim government’s attempt to reassert its authority in the area has been interpreted by the Druze as a sectarian aggression. In minority communities – not just the Druze – this reinforces the perception that the regime is no longer a national actor, but an ideological faction governing for a majority.

Ahmed al-Sharaa attempted damage control on Wednesday, accusing Israel of sabotaging mediation efforts with its attacks on government facilities and thanking the United States and regional mediators for preventing further escalation. But on the ground, his troop withdrawal reveals a real loss of control. Al-Sharaa has been unable to guarantee protection to other sects in the face of the expansion of Islamist groups within its own military apparatus.

Why does Israel support the Druze?

Israel is attempting to fill this void through its historical relationship with the Druze community, particularly in the occupied Golan Heights. Part of this community serves in the Israeli army, and familial and symbolic ties with the Syrian Druze remain strong. This connection has served as justification for Tel Aviv's latest actions, which claim to be acting to protect the minority, although its motivations are also strategic, with a territorial expansion toward Suwayda.

For Israel, the weaker Damascus is, the greater its leeway to dictate the terms of a possible security agreement. But this logic has its limits. Washington, under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Turkey, has promoted a strategy of containment. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a de-escalation agreement and called for restoring internal trust as a condition for stability. A task that, at this time, seems beyond Al Sharaa's reach.

The Al Sharaa government finds itself in a paradoxical situation: it needs to reach an agreement with Israel to stabilize the country, but any step in that direction could upset the delicate balance with the Islamist factions that support it. Its room for maneuver is shrinking, and without guarantees for minorities or control over the forces on the ground, no ceasefire will be sufficient. However, the Druze could feel increasingly tempted to place themselves under Israel's protection.