The end of the Kurdish experiment, a warning for the Druze

BeirutFor a decade, the Euphrates River served as an invisible border within Syria. In the east, a region under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), dominated by Kurdish militias, had built an autonomy de facto With US support and under the central justification of the war against the Islamic State (Daesh). In the west, Damascus awaited its opportunity to return. At the beginning of this year, the line was broken. Government forces crossed the river, and the territorial map of the northeast began to unravel.

Friday's announcement of a comprehensive agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government merely formalizes a dynamic that had been underway for weeks. The understanding provides for the gradual deployment of state security forces in key cities in the northeast and the integration of Kurdish military structures within the state apparatus. According to the known terms, Kurdish fighters will be reorganized into three brigades integrated into the Syrian army, under central command. More than an unexpected turn of events, the agreement confirms the loss of political and territorial leverage by the Kurdish administration.

The progressive fall of Kurdish positions in the northeast It not only redefines the military order, but also sends a political message to the rest of the country, especially in the south, where the Druze community of Suwayda has been exploring forms of self-government for months. What happened in the northeast serves as a warning to this minority with historical ties to Israel. The message of the self-proclaimed Syrian president, Ahmed al-SharaaOf course: the window for negotiating autonomy is narrowing.

"The Kurdish question is no longer a military matter; it's a problem of political integration," summarizes Sihanok Dibo, representative of the Kurdish autonomous administration of northeastern Syria. His diagnosis comes when the SDF's room for maneuver is narrower than ever. After being expelled from Aleppo, they lost ground in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. Arab tribes rebelled against their control. The January 18 agreement with Damascus—withdrawal east of the Euphrates in exchange for political guarantees—fell apart in a matter of days. The announced pact now seeks to end this phase of instability.

US changes sides

So, Washington, which for years protected the Kurdish experiment, now supports a reunified Syria from DamascusAnd Turkey, which considers the Kurdish militias a strategic threat on its border, sees a long-sought goal achieved. The result is a shift in the regional balance of power that leaves the Kurds without solid external backers.

The immediate consequence is the redefinition of the SDF's role. Until now, its main asset was the custody of thousands of ISIS prisoners in prisons in the northeast. This role guarantees Western protection. But with the withdrawal of its forces and the gradual transfer of these prisons to the Syrian state, this function is diminishing. Dibo warns that, if this transition is not managed carefully, "the Islamic State could regain ground in the desert areas of eastern Syria."

The uncertainty is felt with particular intensity in Kobani, a city that symbolized Kurdish resistance against Daesh in 2014. Its future depends on agreements between the SDF and Damascus that have yet to be fulfilled. The announced plan calls for the withdrawal of heavy Kurdish forces and the deployment of local police affiliated with the Syrian Interior Ministry. However, fears of reprisals and the entry of outside militias into the city persist, fueled by reports of looting and executions in other areas following the SDF withdrawal.

As the northeast is being reshaped, the Druze community in the south is watching closely. In Suwayda, local leaders have pushed for autonomy and protection from a central state still perceived as fragile. But Damascus's advance against Kurdish autonomy is altering the balance of power. If the government manages to consolidate its control in the northeast, its negotiating position with Suwayda will be strengthened.

A Centralized Syria

Added to this is the Israeli position. In the south, Israel maintains a clear strategy to guarantee a security zone in the north of the Golan HeightsThat priority outweighs its occasional support for local minorities. A Western diplomat in Damascus summarizes that Israel can be flexible with internal political arrangements, but not with its security perimeter.

In contrast, the project to fragment Syria into autonomous entities is losing international support. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States are now betting on a centralized Syria, with ad hoc agreements to integrate minorities. Russia, weakened after the fall of Assad, publicly supports "the restoration of Syrian territorial integrity," as Vladimir Putin recently declared after receiving his Syrian counterpart in Moscow.

Syria is thus entering a new phase. Two years after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime and Al-Sharaa's arrival in Damascus, the dispute no longer revolves around who controls the state, but rather how it is being reorganized. The Euphrates is no longer a war zone. It is now the focal point for negotiations on power-sharing, the limits of local autonomy, and the model of state that will emerge from the postwar period. For Suwayda, the lesson of the Northeast is clear.