Takaichi's Japan seeks the endorsement of the ballot box

TokyoJapan will hold snap general elections this Sunday, just over a year after the last ones when Sanae Takaichi She has barely been in government for three months. An unusual timeline even in a system accustomed to a certain degree of volatility: the decision is eminently political and reveals the new prime minister's willingness to submit her project, which points to a break with some historical consensuses, to electoral validation.

The early election is largely explained by a strategic calculation by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed almost uninterrupted since 1955. In this context, Takaichi seeks to take advantage of a window of opportunity before the wear and tear of governing, internal tensions within the party, or decisions become visible. The election thus becomes a tool to consolidate her leadership and reinforce her authority within a system traditionally dominated by balances between factions.

The opposition goes to the polls in a state of fragmentation. The creation of the Chūdō Kaikaku Rengō, a forced alliance between the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito following the latter's split with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), has been met with skepticism by both analysts and party members. Decades of cooperation between the LDP and Komeito have forged electoral loyalties that are difficult to transfer to a new bloc built more on electoral calculation than political conviction.

The call comes at a time of redefining the country's political course, marked by a hardening of rhetoric on security and national identity. In just a few weeks, the government has promoted a more restrictive line on immigration, has reopened debates previously considered taboo – such as the possibility of providing Japan with its own nuclear capabilities In an increasingly unstable regional environment, Japan has escalated its rhetoric in its relationship with China, which has been revived as a central threat in the official narrative. This shift not only has domestic implications but also places Japan in a new position within the strategic balance of East Asia and tests the limits of the constitutional pacifism that has defined the country since the postwar era. In parallel with this ideological shift, the government has deployed a package of decidedly election-driven measures aimed at alleviating, in the short term, the social unrest caused by inflation and wage stagnation. Among the most notable proposals are a temporary reduction in gasoline prices, a drastic decrease in the cost of passports and other administrative procedures for Japanese citizens, and the reopening of the debate on a possible reduction in the consumption tax, currently set at 10%. Popular measures, easily communicated and with an immediate impact on families' perceptions, but which avoid addressing the structural imbalances of the Japanese economy, such as job insecurity, the loss of purchasing power, or the long-term financing of the welfare state in an increasingly aging society.

One of the central tenets of the campaign is the tightening of immigration policy, with a series of measures that seek to limit the arrival and stay of foreigners in a country that, paradoxically, is increasingly dependent on foreign labor. The government has announced stricter visa controls, an increased capacity to deport people with irregular or expired permits, and a downward revision of certain temporary work programs. Emphasis has also been placed on stricter controls on access to social services, arguing that this is necessary to protect public resources for Japanese citizens. These decisions contrast sharply with the country's demographic reality, marked by a sustained decline in the working-age population and by economic sectors, such as construction, elder care, and agriculture, that are already suffering from a chronic labor shortage. Beyond the measures themselves, the most significant aspect is the tone of the government's discourse, which has abandoned Japan's traditional ambiguity on immigration in favor of a clearly identity-based narrative.

The nuclear debate

Another of the most delicate elements introduced into this campaign is the reappearance of the debate on nuclear weapons, one of the great taboos of postwar Japanese politics. Without formulating an explicit proposal or making a formal commitment, key figures in Takaichi's circle have begun to publicly legitimize the discussion about the advisability of acquiring its own nuclear capabilities, in response to the worsening regional security environment. Simply shifting this issue from the realm of the unthinkable to that of the debatable represents a profound shift in the consensus built after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and opens the door to a redefinition of the moral and political boundaries of the Japanese state, beyond the immediate outcome of the elections.

In parallel, the relationship with China has been incorporated into the electoral narrative as an element of external tension. The government has revived a discourse that presents Beijing as Japan's main strategic threat, both militarily and technologically, reinforcing a narrative of harassment that justifies a hardening of defense policy and the pursuit of electoral legitimacy through national strength. However, this approach ignores the complexity of a relationship marked by deep economic interdependence, given that China remains Japan's largest trading partner, and risks turning foreign policy into a tool for domestic mobilization, with economic and diplomatic costs in the short and medium term.