Sabotage or incompetence: what's behind the submarine cable breaks?

BarcelonaIn the digital age, it's easy to think that communications depend on satellites, but the reality is different: 99% of global telecommunications traffic travels through a kilometer-long network of submarine cables. Faster and cheaper than alternatives, these cables are vital for the internet, banking transactions, communications, and electricity transmission.

Despite their critical importance, submarine cables can be vulnerable, especially in areas of high maritime activity and geostrategic interest. The Baltic Sea is undoubtedly one of these sensitive areas because it concentrates a large part of Europe's submarine infrastructure, including communication cables and strategic gas pipelines.

"Intentional cable breaking is becoming increasingly important... it's a new threat that's emerging," Dr. Andrey Makarychev, professor of government and politics at the University of Tartu, Estonia, told ARA. "The incidents are a warning sign and a call to be better prepared; we've learned that the infrastructure is vulnerable."

There are currently an estimated 450 submarine cable systems in operation worldwide, with a combined length exceeding 1.35 million kilometers, according to data from the specialized portal Dgtl Infra. According to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), around 199 breakdowns are recorded each year, an average of almost four incidents per week.

Breakdowns due to "external aggression"

Of these failures, approximately two-thirds are caused by "external aggression" - damage caused by fishing vessels, accidental anchoring, and natural disasters such as underwater earthquakes. A further small proportion of failures are due to internal faults, according to the ICPC.

However, for years, Russia has been accused of using submarine cables as instruments of geopolitical pressure. These suspicions have intensified in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine and a series of incidents in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, which have coincided with episodes of diplomatic tension and efforts to disconnect their power grids from Russian dependence.

Several defense ministers and security analysts have suggested that these breaches could be part of a Russia's hybrid warfare strategy to destabilize Europe and punish its support for Ukraine. The Kremlin, for its part, has categorically denied any involvement and accuses NATO of using these incidents as a pretext to justify an increased military presence in the area and to tighten restrictions on Russian oil and gas exports through the Baltic.

In December, in one of the most recent cases, Finland seized a tanker suspected of dragging its anchor and seizing five submarine cables in the Baltic, including a vital one connecting the country to Estonia. The ship, called theEagle S, was identified as part of a "shadow fleet" of tankers helping Russia to sell oil on global markets, violating international sanctions.

Often, ships suspected of participating in acts of sabotage are not only present at the place and time of the incident, but also exhibit suspicious behavior. Many of these ships reduce their speed as they approach the cables. Suspicious incidents are not limited to the Baltic Sea, however. They have also occurred in the Norwegian Sea, among the islands of Southeast Asia, and even in the Red Sea—geopolitically sensitive and key locations.

And while in this context, any incident raises alarm bells, it would not always be acts of sabotage. According to a recent exclusive by The Washington Post, sources from the security and intelligence services of the United States and various European countries have assured that the latest episodes of this type on the seabed of the Baltic would not have been caused by Russia, but are the result of "accidents caused by inexperienced crews on board ships in poor condition." However, several investigations are still open to determine whether the breaks can be attributed to a deliberate desire to cause harm by Russia or China, or if, on the contrary, the incidents are the result of incompetence or negligence.

For now, Europe is implementing various containment measures against these incidents. Before the invasion of Ukraine, "we knew the Nordic-Baltic region was connected geographically and culturally. But security wasn't a priority," says Professor Makarychev. "Now it is."

In January 2025, NATO launched the mission. Baltic Sentry, with the aim of strengthening maritime presence and improving surveillance in this sea. During the summit held in Helsinki on January 14, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced this operation, which includes new patrols with frigates, aircraft, satellites and underwater drones to detect and prevent sabotage.

In 2022, in response to the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelinesNATO established the Critical Underwater Coordination Cell. This initiative, which began operating in 2023, has as its main objective to improve the security and safety of critical underwater infrastructure. Specifically, members of this initiative pledged to defend against intentional attacks, monitor hostile vessels that could interfere with energy infrastructure, and promote information sharing among alliance members.

Despite advances in underwater surveillance capabilities, attributing attacks remains a difficult task. This is partly because many ships operate under flags of convenience, a practice that allows owners to register vessels in countries with laxer regulations and thus achieve anonymity. Furthermore, crews often come from multiple countries, further complicating the identification of those responsible.