Netanyahu imposes his plan on the generals

BarcelonaIn a marathon ten-hour meeting, Israel's war cabinet approved this morning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plan to "take control" of Gaza City. One million Palestinians are concentrated there after nearly two years of indiscriminate bombing, subjected to the worst famine crisis on the planet, according to the UN. The plan calls for the Israeli army to clear the city by October 7, the second anniversary of the Hamas attack, as it did last year with Rafah, in the south of the Strip. It makes no mention of what Netanyahu had announced: taking control of the entire Gaza Strip. The announcement has generated international condemnation (including Germany, Israel's staunch ally, which has announced the suspension of the sale of weapons that could be used against the population of Gaza) and has been criticized by the opposition and the movement supporting the Israeli hostages—with tens of thousands of people, but the movement most seen by people with protests in the streets—and the Israeli army's high command must carry it out.

The cabinet has also reiterated the mantra of the five objectives of the offensive: the disarmament of Hamas, the return of the 50 hostages still being held (of which 20 are believed to be still alive), the demilitarization of the Strip, Israeli control of security, and the creation of Palestine. The same recipe and the same vague objectives have failed to be achieved in 22 months of war despite having crossed all the red lines.

Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir has strongly opposed the plan. and has warned that the orders given to him by his government are contradictory: "Everything will become complicated. I suggest that you eliminate the objective of returning the hostages," said the general in the meeting, according to a source explained to the newspaper HaaretzThat is, captives cannot be rescued. manu militari, as their families and the movement that supports them warn: invading the areas where they are believed to be held is tantamount to signing their death warrant. The high command's alternative is to continue suffocating the Palestinians in Gaza until reaching an agreement with Hamas, which has expressed its willingness to release the hostages in exchange for a truce, the withdrawal of Israeli troops, and the entry of humanitarian aid. The logic defended by the Israeli high command is that, once the hostages have been freed, open warfare can always be resumed, so Hamas is demanding international guarantees to prevent this from happening. After receiving strong criticism for questioning the political leadership, however, Zamir has said he will do whatever the government tells him to.

"Unrealistic"

In an interview with ARA, former US colonel Seth Krummrich, vice president of the security consultancy Global Guardian, with nearly 30 years of experience in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, warns of the dangers of Netanyahu's plan: "It's completely unrealistic. Israel's combat reservists are extremely resource-intensive, both human and material. Occupying Gaza and maintaining control of the territory, even for only six months or a year, will absorb all of Israel's military capabilities. He says that Netanyahu has to convince his troops every day that what they're doing makes sense."

Krummrich says his own experience in urban combat leads him to believe that "Netanyahu's plan can't work." "When you're fighting in an urban area, if you want to hold ground—not just attack and retreat, as the Israeli army has done so far—you need a huge amount of personnel and equipment. And it's much more difficult if the urban environment has been destroyed, as it has been in much of Gaza. When you blow up buildings and destroy tanks, you're also destroying insurgents, in Hamas, because it's harder for Israeli forces to move in that terrain." The veteran gives the example of Stalingrad in World War II: "The Germans suffered greatly after bombing it. It's the same situation in Gaza."

Military exhaustion

The Israeli high command's main argument for opposing the plan is troop exhaustion, especially with regard to the reservists who have been mobilized longer than expected. Because, beyond the rhetoric, the reality is that the all-powerful Israeli army has become bogged down in Gaza in a war it is not winning. In May, the Israeli government ordered the mobilization of 450,000 reservists for three months, an unprecedented number in the country's history, and which for many represented the seventh time they had been sent to fight in less than two years. That's why Zamir announced last Sunday precisely the opposite of what the government has now ordered him to do: reduce the number of reservists mobilized in combat zones by 30%. This decision is intended to reduce the pressure on the troops, who are feeling exhausted, and comes after the number of volunteers has fallen by more than half compared to the beginning of the war.

The drop in volunteer numbers is attributed to war fatigue, economic hardship, anger over the ultra-Orthodox' refusal to join the army, distrust of the government, and a lack of results. There is also growing concern about the impact on soldiers' mental and physical health of a war that drags on with no clear end. An investigation by the newspaper Haaretz revealed in May that thousands of soldiers with psychological problems have been called back into service. Since October 7, at least 41 active-duty Israeli soldiers are known to have committed suicide, and the government has decided to stop publishing the statistics until the end of the year. A commander confessed this in Haaretz:"People simply aren't showing up. They're exhausted and have problems at work and at home. So we have to recruit others who aren't 100% fit."

Krummrich warns of the impact Netanyahu's order will have on his troops: "They're exhausted after two years of fighting. In this context, morale is falling and the pressure on the economy is enormous: every reservist mobilized is one less person working in factories, businesses, or offices." And there are still logistical problems. In early June, the Israeli daily Maariv He quoted soldiers and officers stationed in Gaza complaining about the lack of spare parts for their tanks. "We have to wait a long time for basic components, and some have already been used up. No one was prepared for such a long war."

The US military official also points out that another major weakness of the plan is precisely that there is no plan for the next day. "Netanyahu has said he wants to control Gaza but not govern it. And that doesn't make sense. If you control Gaza, you have to take care of not only security, but also health, food, water, education, garbage collection, all the social services. And that also requires a lot of resources. I don't think they can do it."

What's left of Hamas?

Regarding the military capability of Hamas and other Palestinian factions, according to Krummrich, although it has been greatly diminished, it still exists. "They can still ambush Israeli forces and hold hostages. They've been dealt a severe blow, but they just need to survive. For Hamas, survival is a success. Israel, on the other hand, must find and eliminate all of its fighters in a partially destroyed urban environment and free all the hostages. And that is much more difficult." The former military officer recalls that "military hostage rescue is the most complicated operation there is. You need precise intelligence on where they are. And once you know where they are, the operation must be perfect: every shot must hit the target, you can't use grenades, and all this while taking enemy fire. The probability of success is low."

And he concludes the military analysis with a single sentence: "With thirty years of experience in special operations, I can say that Gaza is the most complicated situation I have ever seen: due to its political content, the fact that it is in dense and destroyed urban terrain, with hostages, and all in a hyper-pressured international context." It's the chest.