The attack on Iran: a brake or an accelerator for its nuclear program?
Intercepted conversations with senior regime officials confirm that the damage to nuclear facilities was less than expected.
BarcelonaTruces are moments for military marketing: the aggressor countries tend to magnify the damage inflicted, while the attacked countries try to minimize it. And amidst the dust of bombs, it's hard to see clearly. Thus, Donald Trump said that in the June 22 attack he had "destroyed" Iran's nuclear facilities.Iran, on the other hand, claims that the damage has been much less than initially imagined. The only reliable source, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are not allowed to verify the damage. in situ The status of the nuclear facilities. It's also unknown whether Tehran moved the 400 kilos of uranium that the agency said had enriched above 60% before the attack. And it's even more difficult to calculate the political impact: if now in Iran, after the worst attack it has suffered since the war with Iraq in the 1980s, the voices calling for nuclear weapons for protection are growing louder.
What is the status of Iran's nuclear facilities?
Iran's ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, said Monday that the uranium enrichment program will "never" stop because it is for "peaceful energy" purposes and complies with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty signed by the Islamic Republic. "Enrichment is an inalienable right, and we want to implement it," he said in an interview broadcast early this morning on the American network CBS. He also expressed his willingness to negotiate, but warned that "unconditional surrender is not negotiation." "It seeks to dictate our policy," he said, and clarified that "there is no request" for a new meeting with the United States, after Washington will bomb three of the country's main nuclear facilities in support of Israel's attack..
Donald Trump claimed that the Fordo, Natanz, and Esfahan nuclear plants had been "totally destroyed," but it is unclear how much damage has been done to Iran's nuclear program. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said in an interview on CBS on Saturday that at these three plants "there has been significant destruction, but until the Iranians can search under the rubble, they won't know the exact level." Alejandro Zurita, former head of the EU's international cooperation program in nuclear research, told ARA that "it will all be speculation until IAEA inspectors can access the underground part of the facilities."
However, the Washington Post The US reported on Sunday that the US had intercepted Iranian communications in which senior Tehran officials commented that the damage from the attack had not been as destructive and extensive as anticipated. White House press secretary Caroline Leavitt played down the communications but did not deny them: "The idea that anonymous Iranian officials know what happened hundreds of feet underground is nonsense," she said.
The Israeli attack also hit the Khondab IR-40 natural uranium and heavy water reactor at the Arak nuclear complex, which could also eventually produce the other atomic material, plutonium-239, a redesign of which was part of the 2015 nuclear deal between the UN Security Council (including the US under Obama) and the EU.
What about international inspectors?
The Iranian envoy to the UN also denied that his government is threatening Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), or its inspectors, who are currently in Iran but whom Tehran has not allowed access to its nuclear facilities. "There is no threat," Iravani said, although he admitted that the Iranian Parliament has suspended cooperation with the IAEA: "The inspectors are in Iran, they are in safe conditions, but our assessment is that they have not done their job." Grossi, who is one of the names being considered to take over as UN secretary-general next year, is demanding this access and has offered to personally go to Iran, as he did with the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, which is on the front line in Ukraine, to help secure the facilities. But the regime believes that the latest IAEA report of June 12, which warned of a lack of transparency by Iranian authorities regarding the program, legitimized the Israeli attack, something Grossi has denied, while making it very clear that there was no evidence that Tehran wanted to develop nuclear weapons.
Grossi stated that the key is what will happen now. "Iran had a very large and ambitious nuclear program. And part of it may still be standing, and if not, it's clear that they have the knowledge and the industrial capacity. It's a country with very sophisticated nuclear technology, and that can't be 'uninvented.' You can't erase the knowledge or the capabilities they have. In a matter of months, they could have enrichment capacity again. They believe that there is no military solution: that the only way out is to reach an agreement that provides guarantees so that everyone in the region and beyond feels safe to turn the page."
Israel killed the visible scientific leaders of Iran's nuclear program, but Zurita points out that "a program like this doesn't depend on a handful of scientists: the knowledge is there, and we have to see to what extent the infrastructure exists." For the Catalan expert, what happened confirms that Iran was already able to enrich uranium above 90%—necessary to have the atomic bomb—since 2018, when Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement that placed its nuclear program under international control. It was not, therefore, a problem of technological capacity, but of political will.
And the nuclear material?
It's logical to assume that Iran moved the 400 kilos of uranium it had enriched so far to a secret location outside the nuclear facilities. The cylinders (the material is in the form of a gas) could have been moved well before the June 13 attack, because the warnings have been constant: before that day, Israel had killed the Hamas leader in Tehran or bombed the Iranian embassy in Damascus. The IAEA has not been able to confirm these movements, but it has informed the US press, although Trump on Sunday denied reports that Iran had moved the material to the Fordow enrichment plant.
"If the US is willing to negotiate, we will be prepared, but if it wants to dictate policy, any negotiation is impossible," Iravani said regarding the prospect of a diplomatic solution. The Iranian diplomat said on Saturday that Iran would agree to transfer its enriched uranium stockpiles—even those with a 20% enrichment level, which can only be used for civilian purposes—to another country in exchange for the United States' acceptance of its nuclear program. Iran is also willing to leave its nuclear material under IAEA supervision. In any case, he assured that Iran will not relinquish its right to enrich uranium within its territory, a right protected by international law and rejected by the United States.
Has the attack slowed or accelerated Iran's nuclearization?
Iran's nuclear infrastructure may have been more or less damaged, but what is now clear is that Iran is more justified than ever in continuing the race to acquire nuclear weapons. An attack by Israel and the United States would be a disaster in this regard.
One of the risks in the coming times, Zurita reflects, is that Iran will finally withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it ratified in 1980 and which subjects it to international inspections to ensure that its nuclear program remains solely for civilian use. The precedent of North Korea—which abandoned the NPT in 2003—does not inspire optimism, now that Pyongyang is a nuclear power, which, incidentally, no one has considered attacking. The current international uncertainty has prompted Japan and South Korea to seek the infrastructure, knowledge, and materials to develop atomic weapons, without actually doing so. Outside the treaty is Israel, which, like India and Pakistan, has become a nuclear military power without any international oversight. The resolution of the crisis in Iran will also determine whether other countries, such as Turkey, Brazil, or Saudi Arabia, dissatisfied with their influence in the old international order, also decide to take a stand.