Pol Morillas: "Europe must decide now whether it wants to become a great power."

BarcelonaOn the cover of the book In the seniors' playground: Europe facing a hostile world (The Bell), a wolf with a hungry face and a sheep looking at it out of the corner of its eye are drawn. It's a good reflection of the geopolitical, and also existential, dilemma facing Europe now that the global landscape has shifted toward aggression and competition. What does Europe want to be? Is it possible to achieve European power in a world where the law of the strongest once again prevails? Is this the way to guarantee the future of the European Union? Pol Morillas (Barcelona, ​​​​1982), political scientist, director of CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs) and one of the most authoritative voices in analyzing European geopolitics, analyzes it in this vital essay to understand where we are going.

He begins the book by quoting Thucydides: "The strong do what they want, and the weak accept it."

— We are once again living in a world governed by the law of the strongest. The dynamics of international cooperation have weakened, and what now predominates is the struggle between great powers for global power. The original idea of the European Union, linked to the promotion of cooperation in peacetime, no longer seems to fit. The EU was never intended to be an international power; it was a project of internal integration among member states, with little outward focus. That is why Europe now finds itself at a crucial moment of foundational definition: it must decide whether it wants to be a strong power, whether it wants to enter the realm of the majors, in order to withstand this landscape in which instability is and will always be inherent.

What is needed to enter the seniors' playground?

— In the case of Europe, two things at once. On the one hand, its power must not be fragmented. If we look at the EU's own capabilities as a whole, from the economy to trade, we would be predisposed to be an international power like so many others. The problem is that all these powers are fragmented because the individualistic logic prevails among the partners. Therefore, political will is needed from all leaders to commit to strengthening European power, as a whole, and not become obsessed with national power. And, on the other hand, if Europe wants to be an international power, it must utilize all the elements of power. And here we have a problem because, as has been shown, the EU based its project on the desire to forge interdependencies and cooperation. And as the wind of globalization blew in its favor, it possibly relied too much on the dynamics of dependence on other actors: energy, with Russia; security, with the United States; Trade, largely, with China... It has now become clear that interdependencies have become vulnerabilities, and that Europe must work to achieve its famous strategic autonomy.

And this includes defense. Is it the most important aspect of becoming a great power?

— This is the point that has been most revalued. We all know that European defense and security are highly dependent on the United States: directly and through NATO. This has worked until now: few alliances have been as successful as the transatlantic one. Europe could, to a certain extent, ignore them. But Trump has changed that. Trump not only tells Europeans that they can no longer count on Washington's protection, but also tells us that perhaps one day he will consider us rivals. Therefore, it is clear that if Europe wants to be in the big leagues, it needs to guarantee itself autonomy in the military sphere.

So, should we break with the United States?

— Precisely, there is a division in the EU on this issue. There is a tendency that says it is still too early for us to become independent from Washington and that we must get along, even with Trump. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is the most illustrious example in Europe that chooses to still praise the United States and deal as best as possible with the current government, which will not be in power forever. The other tendency is the one that says no, that Trump is the clearest example that change is necessary and that this change must be decisive and structural, leading to a Europe with its own recipes. This tendency believes that, even without Trump, Washington is no longer a reliable partner, because the interests and the center of gravity of the world are changing.

I like to think that Europe is still a benchmark in many things.

— Obviously. In fact, if Europe wants to be a power, it must do so by fostering what it is and always has been: an element of cooperation and good understanding between countries. Although it's not currently the order of the day, internationally we have so many crises requiring cooperation that we will need an actor to promote it and make understanding between countries its raison d'être in the world. And the only actor that can do so now, and with sufficient conviction, is Europe.

How do you assess Europe's withdrawal from the negotiating table on Ukraine?

— It's what we were talking about before: a world governed by the law of the strongest. Putin and Trump speak this language and understand that this war must be resolved their way, even ignoring Volodymyr Zelensky. They see Europe as the typical annoying partner because it speaks a different language and, furthermore, they believe it lacks the capacity or tools to impose its vision. Note that both Putin and Trump, who agree on many aspects, also converge in demonstrating a marked Euroscepticism, which seeks to attack this idea of a strong Europe. Putin has repeatedly demonstrated this, giving impetus to anti-European forces. And Trump personifies the American discourse that seeks a certain revenge against Europe and wants to leave behind that international order in which Europe, and multilateralism, have a certain preeminence.

Putin is one of the names that appears most frequently in his book.

— Putin is the most vivid example of the threat to European societies. Putin is the example of a leader who can act outside the rules of the game, even using brute force. From here, it's a bit difficult for us to understand, but if you travel to countries that border, or almost border, Russia, the perception of threat multiplies. But we must keep one thing in mind: we have our eyes set on the territorial invasion of Ukraine, and so it should be, but that shouldn't make us lose sight of the fact that, meanwhile, another war is being waged. The technological one, the one of political interference, the one of information... today's wars are entirely hybrid. Therefore, if the increase in European defense is justified, in part, by fear of Russian expansionism, it would be a mistake for this increase to be directed solely toward conventional defense, because threats are no longer just conventional. They now come in many forms.

There are also internal threats.

— There has always been a far-right and Euroscepticism, but until now it was a contained Euroscepticism, even in the case of Brexit, which ultimately had no domino effect. We now find ourselves at a time when, within almost all European states, two opposing approaches to what Europe should be are being debated. Until recently, the majority consensus was to deepen European integration, but now another proposal has gained traction and is increasingly gaining power: the Europe of Nations. A Europe transformed from within, where power is returned to the capitals, where Brussels loses influence, and the Union acts only when strictly necessary, unanimously, and with the lowest common denominator. This model now enjoys much broader political support: it governs, supports, or leads the opposition in several countries, including Germany. This poses an enormous challenge to the European project because it undermines the idea of ​​a more united, stronger Europe capable of international projection.

It's still frightening to imagine Germany and France, the driving forces of the EU, with the far right in government.

— It's a possible scenario and, of course, it would have consequences for this powerful Europe. If we are committed to granting the EU greater strategic autonomy, and the leaders who can exploit it are far-right forces with Eurosceptic origins, then it's not a good idea. We must trust that the process toward a powerful Europe is also accompanied by a weakening of the rhetoric that advocates for a completely fragmented Europe. If not, what is the alternative? Do we trust the increasingly unpredictable United States? Do we trust China? In fact, one of the great challenges for this Europe that aspires to be a powerful country is to demonstrate to the population that its political prescription is more beneficial to the lives and security of its citizens than the alternative proposed by those who least want Europe. Because, after all, all these debates and dilemmas are decided at the ballot box.