Manel Ollé: "China seeks that the US are cornered by their own mistakes"

BarcelonaDonald Trump has left China –where he met with Xi Jinping– with kind words, but without having resolved any of his concerns: neither the blockade in Hormuz, nor the Taiwan crisis, nor the trade balance. Manel Ollé, professor of Chinese studies at the UPF and expert in the Asian giant, analyzes the meeting between the two leaders, which has been more marked by gestures than by tangible agreements.

Xi Jinping has defined the meeting as "historic and transcendental" and has spoken of a "new strategic positioning". How should we understand these words?

— To begin with, it should be noted that there has been no joint statement; each has given their own version. China has indeed emphasized this "strategic stability." The feeling is that the meeting aimed to outline a scenario of de-escalation in trade and technological tensions, and to create a framework for moderate competition. This serves China for two things: first, to transmit internal peace and gain prestige, demonstrating that they already deal with the United States on an equal footing, without inferiority. Second, to project an image of stability to the outside. In reality, however, it is a summit of gestures: one talks about Taiwan and the other doesn't, one talks about Iran and the other doesn't. There are no specifics, but a narrative for internal consumption.

How would you define the meeting?

— China is interested in buying time in a scenario of apparent understanding. They now have three meetings in the coming months. This allows them to create a framework of predictability that favors them in the face of Trump's unpredictability. But as far as today is concerned, nothing seems to change substantially in substance. However, the "face-to-face" gestures reinforce the image of a stable and strong China in the eyes of the rest of the world.

Is the good harmony we have seen real or do we have to continue thinking in a framework of confrontation?

— China does not seek direct confrontation, but rather to create new realities. They want the US to be cornered by its own mistakes and have no intention of colliding. In fact, China seems to buy into Trump's worldview of the Monroe Doctrine, the idea of spheres of influence... In reality, what they are doing is "buying the next three years": agreeing not to harm each other during the Trump period, creating a space for controlled rivalry, and resolving problems as they arise.

It is noteworthy that Trump has shown himself to be much more respectful of Xi than of European leaders. Why?

— Trump has an evident fascination with "strong men." He has a kind of envy for the grandiloquence of spaces like the Great Hall of the People, which he would like for the White House, and because he sees that Xi is a person of great power. There has been a change in the way the United States treats China. We have gone from a pure confrontation to a mixture of negotiation and recognition of strength, which adapts to the power the other has.

Can we talk about a diplomatic victory for Beijing?

— China has placed things where it suited it: in the exhibition of symbolic strength. A detail: Xi did not go to receive Trump at the airport, marking distances. Instead, he had him enter the "Zhongnanhai", the enclosure next to the Imperial Palace where the Chinese leadership lives. It is a very reserved area where foreign leaders are rarely received. It is a special, very high-level treatment, but without the classic rituals. The Chinese bet is to give a sense of solidity to the world. Among other things, to change the international discourse on Taiwan, and to impose the framework that it is an "internal affair".

How does Iran fit in here? It was the key folder for Trump.

— Here prevails the traditional Chinese ambiguity. China does not want to influence the world, it wants the world to adjust to its needs. Hormuz worries them because a lot of oil comes from there, but they will not go to solve anyone's problems. They maintain an ambiguous position and an apparent neutrality: they help Russia and Iran without it being noticed much. They have said that they are in favor of the strait being opened and that Iran does not have nuclear weapons... little for Washington. It is true that Trump has boasted that China will buy oil and Boeing planes from them, but it will be necessary to see if these promises are really computable.

What can we expect from the commercial side? Will there be a real truce on tariffs?

— There seems to be a general pullback after the initial tariff offensive that occurred to rebalance the trade balance. But what really worries China is the microchip embargo. Jensen Huang's visit with Trump is key: the US has banned the sale of the most advanced chips to China, and this has forced China to accelerate its own production. The real war is for leadership in artificial intelligence, and the chips are made in Taiwan.

Taiwan was precisely the other important topic. How should we read it?

— For China it is a matter of principle. But it does not mean they have to carry out any invasion in the short term. Xi Jinping has recently beheaded his military leadership and currently does not have the capacity for a military incursion. Its intervention strategy is more complex: it controls the main opposition party (the Kuomintang) and thus has managed to curb arms purchase spending. The Chinese are relieved because Trump has said nothing against them on the issue of Taiwan.

Is China prepared to dispute global hegemony with the United States?

— China has many internal contradictions, but its objective is not to "dominate" the world, but to make some alterations in the world order. For example, to break the hegemony of the dollar and secure its zones of influence. They work for internal stability and to ensure their supply. Rather than confronting the US, they expect it to sink on its own due to its own crisis. And they believe that China, with its medium-term objectives, will naturally find its place in the world without seeking collision.