Josep Vilarasau: "That the president of La Caixa commands more than the President of the Generalitat? Lie"

[[This interview was published in 2012]] We are probably in front of one of the most influential bankers of the 20th century. He receives us in his office, where he has recently become accustomed to speaking with journalists again, after nine years of silence. He is friendly, but you can tell he doesn't like it. The idea of retiring from one day to the next seemed "unbearable" to him, he has written in his memoirs. The strange path of La Caixa , which has now been published by RBA. That's why he has to speak, in a book that only addresses his professional career. The financial law (Rodrigo Rato), in its adaptation to Catalan legislation (Artur Mas), approved by the Parliament (consent of the PSC), included a provision ad hoc to remove him from power after 27 years at La Caixa. Asked about the issue at an informal breakfast in a city bar, the current president of the Generalitat and candidate for re-election for CiU stated: "In Catalonia, power is exercised from Plaça de Sant Jaume, not from Diagonal".

Have you ever spoken with Artur Mas? When I left office I stopped attending many official events. We rarely meet. And when it happened, he stayed silent and I stayed silent.

And what would I say to him if I had the chance? Res.

Some say that the president of La Caixa has more power than the president of the Government. What power is more? Rotten lie. When the Generalitat wanted me out, they made a law and kicked me out. That's how you rule. I wouldn't have been able to remove anyone from the Generalitat.

In his last press conference as president, he called to keep La Caixa independent. Is it? I think so. Isidre Fainé and Joan Maria Nin [current CEO] have stood up to whoever it may be.

Did he/she receive many calls asking for favors, investments, loans? At first they tried, I must say, not much. And each time it happened less. Soon it ran that it didn't work with me.

What is the response to the criticism of La Caixa for not investing enough in the Catalan business fabric? I hadn't heard this theory. What they had told me was: "Why don't you do like Banc de Sabadell, which gives a lot of credit to SMEs?" I asked myself about my function. And I concluded that it was that people who deposited money at La Caixa should always be able to get it back and have a good return on their money. I could continue investing in safe things like mortgages - which doesn't mean sharing the pie with developers - or do like Sabadell. But then I would have had to change all the workers; theirs had a nose, they knew very well what was happening in small businesses. And we continued with mortgages.

La Caixa made an offer for Banca Catalana. In his book, he says that Jordi Pujol's mistake was to grant credits to insolvent companies .

He was doing it because he did not want any Catalan company to go bankrupt. His technical reports already told him no, no, and no. But he said they had to be saved. Perfect, but he took the bank to the grave.

Was Banca Catalana awarded to banks to avoid strengthening a savings bank? Yes, totally. But it must be said that it was very good for us that they didn't give it to us! We would have had to do very unpleasant things with an entity that we had right in front of us. I could already see the protests at La Caixa's door. It also made sense. All the money had to come from the banks' guarantee fund, not from the savings banks'.

He defended the savings bank model to the end. But, the first problem, politicization, even though it was not his case. Caja Madrid case. I had good directors. But the last three were politicians. Terceiro, appointed by the PSOE; Blesa, a friend of Aznar, and Rato, former vice-president. If they don't know, you have to be careful.

Second. The patrimonialization of savings banks by directors. You can be a star. But what if you messed up, who would control you, without shareholders? Ah, excuse me. Just like in banks. Mario Conde entered a [Banesto] bank that was super-watched, super-controlled and ruined it in five minutes. Almost everything depends on the maximum executive. A board of directors can do very little. It's very difficult. Many people on the board say: "I haven't found out anything". Well, that's true.

But look how he made and unmade things at La Caixa. He promoted himself to chairman, split the management, insisted on the directors' vote... Yes, I wanted to extend my time at La Caixa, I didn't want to retire. But I acted with everyone's agreement. And I did like Botín at his bank. Or like the gentleman from Iberdrola. Or like at BBVA. Shareholders are there, but as if they weren't. When a company or a bank is big enough, executives are in charge. At General Motors. At Exxon. Who is in charge at La Caixa? The executives. And it doesn't go bankrupt because when the executives detect a bad one, they remove it.

He made a mea culpa in his memoirs. He says it was a mistake to keep in charge when he accessed the presidency. Not delegating to Fainé and Brufau. Yes. I made a mistake. I did not delegate as president. I have written this many years later. What do you want to do about it?

Then didn't he realize? Probably not. But it's no use now imagining what would have happened if I had behaved differently. It's like saying: what if I had married so-and-so? It's already done.

Did he feel betrayed by the La Caixa leadership when they removed him from power? Betrayed? Well, I talk about it in the book. Fainé and Brufau could have hidden it a little more. They kept telling me it wasn't right. But, deep down, they were removing a cover from them. And they could fly. It's human. They had been under my command for many years.

He said he felt alone. Also because of the attitude of the press. Do you think the press is free with regard to La Caixa? In general I think so, with its tendencies. In the case of La Caixa, there are people who say that La Vanguardia will never be against the entity, Javier Godó is its vice-president.

In his autobiography he reproduces a graphological study of his that describes him as intelligent, dynamic, tenacious... but also stubborn, authoritarian, and even brutal. Does he recognize himself in it? They made me write something by hand and I didn't know what it was for. I only found out why years later. It's hard to recognize yourself in something like that. They tell you a lot of things that, from the inside, you don't see.

I ask him because he has a reputation for being a particularly cold person. No, no. Perhaps outwardly, but not with the people I work with.

Does it say many things in memories? No. But, as I gather at the beginning of the book, sometimes the memory of the elderly coincides with the facts, but only in part and only sometimes. The third time you have thought, perhaps falsely, that something happened in a certain way, you will forever believe that it happened that way.

Do you think they retired him because he wanted to turn La Caixa into a bank? I don't know. No. I think they retired me because they thought I had been at La Caixa too long. They found a convoluted way to do it.

You made La Caixa great for 27 years and had an unexpected and rapid departure. Perhaps you wanted to make your mark. Are they vindicatory memoirs? I don't really know why I wrote the book, I've been working on it, intermittently, for almost five years.

Before La Caixa, he changed jobs often. And he always said he had no idea, not even about telecoms to Telefónica, nor of oil to Campsa, nor of debt to the Treasury... Is it about modesty? It is true. And do you know why? I began to realize that when a new executive arrives at a place, rather than saying or doing, they must ask and listen. They learn very quickly if they ask and listen a lot. And a day comes when they ask and the others perhaps no longer know how to answer. Or they already know how to find someone who can answer them. Knowledge can be learned, but running a company is knowing how to manage people and why something has failed.

I have counted that he did not stay more than three years in any company... They called me to do better things, it was logical that I said yes. In fact, I was forced out of Telefónica, my president and the minister forced me to go and direct the Treasury. But then I have to admit that those years in the ministry gave me very useful knowledge for the future to understand how the administration worked from the inside, and they gave me many contacts, and to know the Bank of Spain. And, since I went to La Caixa, they only sounded me out from outside once, to chair Banco Hispano, and I considered it was not appropriate.

What do you think was the key to making La Caixa a leader? I anticipated the rest of the sector, but not by much, because it reacted. But I think the key is to always ask yourself why. Why can't it be done another way. Sometimes in small things and sometimes in big things. The IT people and the loan people mechanized all the staff loans. They came out done, ready to sign. Why not do it with mortgage loans? That way we would know there wouldn't be any errors.

Could the crisis have been avoided? It was a spiral that all entities followed with more or less risk. Houses were worth five, then seven, then twelve. Developers made a lot of money. And the people from the banks gave a loan, they earned 5% or 7%, while the developer, with that loan, earned 100%. The developers always offered us to become partners in the developments, and we always said no, that we only provided the credit. But the temptation was very great: if the developer built a house and sold it for double what it cost, the temptation was to say: maybe yes. And it was dangerous, because you put yourself in the developer's hands. You didn't know if the mortgage was done right or wrong. And if the developer was doing badly, they thought you would help them.

When La Caixa took over, there were 110 banks in Spain. And now there are 14 left. What about competition? It is good that they are healthy, few or many. It is good that the gentleman who leaves the money there knows he can get it back. That he has no problems. Today there are two savings banks, that of Pollença, with only four branches. And it continues to be a savings bank. And that of Ontinyent. It stays in its place. And there are the Basque ones, and Unicaja, from Malaga. Maybe they form a bank, but they are doing well.

Strategically, La Caixa is focusing on financial business and withdrawing from the industrial group. Do you see it well? If you need the money, you are doing very well. La Caixa is a savings bank because people trust it and bring their money there so it is safe. Investing in companies corresponds to an old philosophy, because there was a lot of inflation, and if you bought Telefónica shares, they did not lose value because they were a millionth part of a physical asset. On the other hand, loans were constantly devalued. We wanted to have our own part against inflation. Today this makes no sense with the euro, and it penalizes having shares.

He multiplied social work by 25. Do you think he directed it in the most appropriate direction? It multiplied a lot, yes, also because at first it was very small. The proportion of a third of the profit may be little, but when you earn a lot, a third is a lot. And regarding orientation, you didn't have to have taste, but rather think about how to use the money based on what they produced. You put on an exhibition and it appeared in a thousand newspapers. You did an action for Alzheimer's or a donation to an NGO and almost nothing appeared. One of La Caixa's guidelines was not to do social work for publicity. But that has changed because the market has become difficult. Others were advertising. It was foolish to hide what we were doing.