Francoist espionage was capital for Franco's victory

BarcelonaOfficially, the Spanish Civil War ended on April 1, 1939, with the victory of the rebel faction led by Franco, who signed the last war report in Burgos. The Francoists had won on the front, but the fall of the Second Republic was also prepared from the rear. The Information and Military Police Service (SIPM) played a central role in controlling propaganda, diplomacy, and the decomposition of the enemy from within.

With unpublished documentation from Spanish and international archives, much of which was not accessible until 2020, the professor of contemporary history Gutmaro Gómez Bravo (Madrid, 1975) reconstructs an intelligence operation aimed at attracting Republican military leaders and accelerating their surrender. In "How the Spanish Civil War Ended" (Crítica), the historian explains that Francoist espionage was decisive in the outcome of the conflict and that the narrative about the end of the war began to be constructed long before the Republican defeat.

"The end of the war has been quite mistreated. Often the Republican collapse has been explained based on chaos, conspiracies, or personal betrayals, but the documentation offers a different version," he assures. According to Gómez Bravo, the espionage network not only obtained information but also generated it to provoke internal divisions. Leading it was Colonel José Ungría, who placed the secret police at the head of state security, inspired by the German Nazi model.

Two names often appear when explaining the end of the conflict: Republican Colonel Segismundo Casado and socialist leader Julián Besteiro. Both staged the coup d'état of March 5, 1939, against Juan Negrín's government. But, according to the historian, the events are part of a much more complex framework, marked by intense recruitment efforts and strong internal pressures.

Isolate those who did not want to surrender

From February 1939, Casado was the object of constant surveillance by the Francoist services. "They met with Casado practically every day for several weeks, but the recruitment work goes much further," explains Gómez Bravo. The Francoists had a large amount of information and were able to anticipate Republican movements. "They were isolating the only nucleus that did not want to surrender, they separated it from the rest, and they managed to get several Republican military personnel to work for them. In some cases, they even gave them orders directly," he states.

The agents promised that, if a surrender occurred, there would be no reprisals and an amnesty would be applied. They also exploited the division between professional soldiers and soldiers or militiamen, to whom they did not recognize the same status. They assured that the negotiation conditions would be different for some and for others. It was a long-term intelligence operation, aimed at the recruitment and surrender of the enemy from within. Police officers, journalists, and military commanders, among other key actors, were recruited to accelerate the internal decomposition of the Republic.

The documentation consulted shows how, from Burgos, Republican information was obtained practically in real-time. "Republican espionage failed to overcome its embryonic state. There were many political intelligence services that were dedicated to investigating each other instead of confronting the enemy. This was not only a weakness, but the general command in Burgos took advantage of it to recruit them," he explains.

The technical superiority of the Francoist spies

On the other hand, the Francoist side had a much more modern intelligence system, partly thanks to German and Italian support. The development of radio and encryption machines anticipated technologies that would later be used during World War II.

From the second half of 1937 onwards, the Francoist army had already created an encrypted communication network that allowed it to anticipate Republican political movements. "If Azaña or the generals who were in France spoke with Negrín, they already knew what decisions they would make. This anticipation was fundamental," says Gómez Bravo.

In these circumstances, with little opposition from Republican espionage, it was relatively easy to spread information favorable to surrender among a population hungry and exhausted after thirty months of war. The agent networks remained active and operational during the dictatorship, and were integrated into the Politico-Social Brigades. Their effects were devastating, on a population that had been promised negotiation and guarantees in case of surrender, and which was brutally punished.The subsequent humanitarian drama cannot be explained solely as an immediate consequence of the military collapse or the crumbling of the Republican fronts, as the official Francoist narrative maintained for decades. "The war was prolonged to facilitate an unconditional surrender that would guarantee political and military control of the territory," assures the historian. Hungary wanted a complete victory without international negotiation scenarios that could limit the scope of subsequent repression or condition the new political order. It was not just about winning the war in military terms, but about establishing the conditions that would allow the consolidation of the new regime without any opposition.