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    <title><![CDATA[Ara in English - Chavismo]]></title>
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    <description><![CDATA[Ara in English - Chavismo]]></description>
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    <ttl>10</ttl>
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      <title><![CDATA[Delcy Rodríguez changes the Venezuelan government and institutions]]></title>
      <link><![CDATA[https://en.ara.cat/international/delcy-rodriguez-changes-the-venezuelan-government-and-institutions_1_5684698.html]]></link>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://static1.ara.cat/clip/cf3d1fc8-15ba-434b-82b9-291e6092face_16-9-aspect-ratio_default_0.jpg" /></p><h3>After twelve years at the helm of Venezuela's Ministry of Defense, Vladimir Padrino López left his post this week. It was neither a random nor an isolated change: President Delcy Rodríguez dismissed him, adding him to the growing list of key Chavista figures who have been removed from their positions. Since January, Nicolás Maduro's successor has implemented 13 changes in the executive branch, in addition to the dismissal of the attorney general and several military officials. The changes driven by Rodríguez aim to place more technically skilled individuals at the head of key ministries and institutions, although the shift is not always so clear. The replacements do not necessarily diminish Chavismo's power, but rather focus on installing people trusted by the new president, belonging to what is known in the country as "enlightened Chavismo," comprised of figures with more technical than military backgrounds. Several analysts point out that, while some changes might be motivated by a desire to present himself to the international community as an innovative administration in contrast to Maduro's, most are explained more by an attempt to maintain control of institutions and avoid internal divisions. In this way, Rodríguez is trying to survive in an extremely complex situation, where he must carefully measure his actions to avoid overstepping the ideological boundaries of Chavismo, secure the support of powerful circles, and, at the same time, appear sufficiently open to the demands of the United States. The case of the Ministry of Defense is paradigmatic: he replaces a key figure from the Maduro era in the government, but instead of appointing an innovative candidate, he designates Gustavo González López, a military intelligence specialist close to Diosdado Cabello, the Minister of the Interior, and Nicolás Maduro. Furthermore, the new Minister of Defense is also linked to the Rodríguez siblings (the country's president, Delcy Rodríguez, and the president of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez). González López, sanctioned since 2015 by the United States and the European Union for human rights violations during his tenure as Interior Minister, faces the challenge of restoring the prestige of a ministry particularly damaged after the US attack. Several sources have publicly stated that US soldiers entered and advanced into the country without encountering significant Venezuelan military resistance. In fact, the security cordon they had the most difficulty overcoming, according to this information, was that of the Cuban military, which was carrying out security operations for the Chavista regime—a fact that cast doubt on López's position. Reduction of ties with Maduro<h3/><p>On the same day she announced the change to the Ministry of Defense, Rodríguez also ordered changes in ministries such as Labor, Transportation, Electric Power, and Higher Education. These portfolios are now mostly headed by figures who, while still Chavistas, have a more technocratic profile. They are also considered ideologically close—and some personally close—to Delcy Rodríguez, who, during her time as vice president, promoted measures to relax certain economic laws, always within the ideological framework of Chavismo. One of the names Rodríguez has also removed, and who is clearly linked to Maduro and singled out by the US, is Alex Saab, who until January was Minister of Industries and National Commerce. The new president dismissed him a few days after taking office, amid accusations from Washington—and from former Venezuelan Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz—that he is Maduro's main front man. Besides being dismissed, he hasn't been seen in public for weeks. The US is requesting his extradition, and several media outlets, such as the <em>New York Times</em> They indicate that he will be detained in Venezuela from the beginning of February.</p>]]></description>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Víctor Sanz Guerrero]]></dc:creator>
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      <pubDate><![CDATA[Fri, 20 Mar 2026 17:51:17 +0000]]></pubDate>
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      <media:title><![CDATA[Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez, along with the new Minister of Defense, Gustavo González López, in Caracas, Venezuela.]]></media:title>
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      <subtitle><![CDATA[The interim president replaces profiles close to Maduro with figures she trusts and from the so-called "enlightened Chavismo"]]></subtitle>
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      <title><![CDATA[Two months of forced and unequal peace between Venezuela and the United States]]></title>
      <link><![CDATA[https://en.ara.cat/international/venezuela-and-the-united-states-sign-forced-and-unequal-peace-two-months-after-maduro-s-capture_1_5677603.html]]></link>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://static1.ara.cat/clip/c50700da-ed65-4969-823d-6abac6e08714_16-9-aspect-ratio_default_0.jpg" /></p><p>Since <a href="https://en.ara.cat/international/from-illegitimate-kidnapping-to-the-cooperation-agenda-chronology-of-delcy-rodriguez-s-rapprochement-with-the-us_1_5610010.html" >Delcy Rodríguez announced a "cooperation agenda" with the White House</a> Just over 24 hours after Nicolás Maduro's capture, Caracas has been forced to capitulate to Washington week after week. The United States governs Venezuela through the back door and has managed to get Chavismo to implement reforms to liberalize the economy, while the Trump administration has restored trade with the Latin American country in a highly restricted manner and under exceptional conditions. In the two and a half months since the attack, Venezuela has opened its doors to the US for its natural resources. Trump himself acknowledged this last weekend at the summit in Miami with Latin American leaders allied with the White House: "We are getting enormous amounts of oil out," he stated. On paper, Chavismo's opening to US investment began at the end of January. At that time, the National Assembly approved an amendment to the hydrocarbons law, confirming a pragmatic—and forced—shift by Chavismo in the face of US pressure. The Venezuelan Parliament approved a bill that reduces state controls over the industry and places fewer obstacles in the way of foreign private companies participating in oil exploration. Until now, they could only do so in joint ventures in which the state always held a majority stake, but the new legislation allows this to change. In the area of ​​trade, the government of Delcy Rodríguez has also promoted a new mining law, approved in its first reading this week in the Venezuelan Parliament. Although the text may still undergo some modifications, the intention is to establish the legal framework to provide legal guarantees to companies, with the aim of generating confidence and attracting foreign private investment. In case of conflict, the law establishes mediation and arbitration mechanisms that should resolve disputes. <a href="https://en.ara.cat/international/trump-meets-with-dozen-major-oil-companies-to-discuss-the-future-of-venezuelan-crude_1_5613592.html" >the doubts that some major oil companies like Exxon expressed in their meeting with Trump in January</a>, in which they called for reforms before investing in the country to avoid exposing themselves to asset seizure.</p>]]></description>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Víctor Sanz Guerrero]]></dc:creator>
      <guid isPermaLink="true"><![CDATA[https://en.ara.cat/international/venezuela-and-the-united-states-sign-forced-and-unequal-peace-two-months-after-maduro-s-capture_1_5677603.html]]></guid>
      <pubDate><![CDATA[Fri, 13 Mar 2026 16:49:11 +0000]]></pubDate>
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      <media:title><![CDATA[Venezuela's interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, alongside US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum, at a meeting in Caracas on March 4.]]></media:title>
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      <subtitle><![CDATA[Chavismo liberalizes the economy under Washington's tutelage and breaks ties with Cuba]]></subtitle>
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      <title><![CDATA[The uncertain transition to democracy in Venezuela]]></title>
      <link><![CDATA[https://en.ara.cat/international/the-uncertain-transition-to-democracy-in-venezuela_129_5616385.html]]></link>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://static1.ara.cat/clip/f8bf5c74-0d1b-4e37-bae1-6c8461656ed6_16-9-aspect-ratio_default_0.jpg" /></p><p>The ashes of the destruction left in Venezuela by the US military attack had barely cooled when we began to hear talk of a possible transition to democracy. We have heard these words so many times they have become a litany, especially since 2013, the year Nicolás Maduro replaced Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela. This shouldn't surprise us. The country's elites have been unable to resolve the political crisis that deepened after 2004, the year in which the constitutional reform, championed by Chávez as the cornerstone of his political project, failed at the polls. Very few realized that by leaving Chavismo in charge of the government and territorial control, President Donald Trump was nullifying or minimizing the role the opposition could play in a hypothetical transition. A process that seems uncertain, because the pieces for its realization are far from complete. Maryhen Jiménez, a PhD in political science from Oxford University, recalls that opposition groups in Venezuela tried unsuccessfully to remove Hugo Chávez from power through various means, both legal and illegal. Chavismo demonstrated a remarkable ability to maintain its grip on power. It is likely that the Trump administration concluded that political change does not depend solely on military intervention or regime change. <em>fast track</em> not from the executive branch (the person in charge of the presidency), but from a more complex reconfiguration of internal balances that includes actors within the system.</p>]]></description>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hugo Prieto]]></dc:creator>
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      <pubDate><![CDATA[Tue, 13 Jan 2026 06:01:17 +0000]]></pubDate>
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      <media:title><![CDATA[Venezuela's interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, at an event with relatives of the Venezuelan and Cuban military personnel who died during the US attack on Venezuela on January 3rd.]]></media:title>
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      <title><![CDATA[The questions (and the certainties) left by Trump's operation in Venezuela]]></title>
      <link><![CDATA[https://en.ara.cat/international/the-questions-and-the-certainties-left-by-trump-s-operation-in-venezuela_129_5609235.html]]></link>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://static1.ara.cat/clip/9f608457-e9f1-4b73-a345-e7854da0c616_16-9-aspect-ratio_default_0.jpg" /></p><p>The military operation carried out by the US government raises many questions and clarifies some things. Let's begin by stating that the true interest of Donald Trump's administration has always been to seize control of Venezuela's oil wealth. He also made it clear in his press conference at Mar-a-Lago, Florida, that the United States would "run" the country from that moment on. At the same time, the "extraction" of Nicolás Maduro as a defendant in a drug trafficking case is a strictly legal matter, with no political validity or consideration given to his status as head of state. <em>de facto </em>From Venezuela.</p>]]></description>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Hugo Prieto]]></dc:creator>
      <guid isPermaLink="true"><![CDATA[https://en.ara.cat/international/the-questions-and-the-certainties-left-by-trump-s-operation-in-venezuela_129_5609235.html]]></guid>
      <pubDate><![CDATA[Mon, 05 Jan 2026 06:00:56 +0000]]></pubDate>
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      <media:title><![CDATA[A person displays a portrait of Nicolás Maduro at a demonstration against the US attack.]]></media:title>
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