There are jokes that, besides being grotesque, are revealing. A recent example: Feijóo's claim that the party that wins the legislative elections should have a "bonus" reward in the form of receiving between 20 and 50 additional seats as a gift, which, if they had been voted for, would have been won by other parties. That is, to force an absolute majority by legal imperative, and thus save the winner from having to look for partners and make concessions.

Governing without depending on pacts is the great aspiration of any candidate for Moncloa. With this objective in their sights, the leader of the PP, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, has resurrected a controversial recipe that his predecessor, Pablo Casado, already put on the table: giving an extra bonus of deputies to the most voted list in the general elections. Would it be possible with a simple reform of the electoral law as the popular party proposes? All experts consulted by ARA agree emphatically that no: to be able to apply the measure, the Constitution would have to be reformed.

Political parties are fundamental components of the democratic system. Undeniable. And yet, political parties are now directly responsible for the growing disconnect between citizens and democracy as a system of representation and governance. This contradiction has become increasingly tangible in recent decades as a critical issue and part of the explanation for the rise of populist and anti-democratic options. Two fundamental elements of the democratic system have been in place since the Transition: the basic legislation on political organizations and the proportional representation electoral system. Spanish (and Catalan) regulations grant political parties exclusive power in the dual function of representing citizens and selecting candidates for positions of responsibility in various institutions. The legitimacy of proportional representation systems is more than established, but we also know that they include criteria such as "closed and blocked" lists, which limit and undermine the direct relationship between elected officials and voters. Beyond the party leaders and candidates for regional or local government, political parties are no longer able to maintain a dialogue with the citizens they theoretically represent. Does anyone know who "my representative" is? Who, beyond their immediate party and social circle, knows the members of one electoral list or another? How can we evaluate or criticize their legislative performance, or their direct contact with their electorate? The initial good intention (1978), which aimed to guarantee political pluralism and respect for minorities, has resulted in a clear disconnect between political forces and a society that has lost much of the trust and respect it should owe its representatives. The virtues of proportional representation were minimized from the outset by the definition of provincial constituencies that favored (or imposed) a two-party system considered a guarantee of stability.

It does not appear explicitly in the 1978 Spanish Constitution, but the electoral framework established by royal decree in 1977 and consolidated by the Organic Law of the General Electoral System (LOREG) has significantly shaped Spanish and Catalan politics. Unlike the hundreds of constitutions worldwide, the Spanish Constitution includes few details about the electoral system: that Congress must have between a minimum of 300 and a maximum of 400 seats (it has had 350 since 1977), that the electoral district must be the province, and that it will have an initial population and a "minimum representation"; the deputies will be elected using "proportional representation criteria." The LOREG consolidated in 1985 that each province is entitled to an initial minimum of two seats and that the D'Hondt method would be used to allocate them.