Normality in the Spanish state goes through the hegemony of the ultra-nationalist right, whether it's called PP, whether it's called Vox, or whether it's called a magistracy and powers of the state handed over to the cause of sostenella y no enmendalla, the vivan las caenas and all this rich tradition. If the answer is Spain, then what is the question?Political projects that can question the hegemony of black, monolithic, and self-devouring Spain (see octopuses, which eat themselves; see Goya's Saturn Devouring His Son) always require majorities that are difficult to maintain due to their own internal composition. Catalan independence, to have any strength, needs to bring together all the different forms of democratic independence: center-right, center-left, anti-capitalist, etc. And even then, to add other sovereignist and Catalanist forces. What was interesting about the "Procés" were mainly two things: on the one hand, the fact that it emerged from the bottom up, starting from the demonstration on July 10, 2010. On the other hand, having achieved this sum of forces from such different political cultures, united in the common objective of a referendum on self-determination. Since it was not achieved, there was a moral of defeat that led to succumbing to all self-destructive temptations, and now to the most self-destructive of all, which is to incorporate a false far-right independence into the equation. But that's another story.Regarding the governance of Spain, avoiding the crushing power of the right-wing (“stopping the far-right,” as it's commonly put, and also the right-wing that claims not to be so extreme but easily reaches government agreements with it, and forgive the wordplay) is perhaps even more difficult. It necessarily involves bringing the Spanish left-wing parties together with the wrongly named Catalan and Basque nationalisms (who is truly nationalist, and with all the tools at their disposal, is the Spanish state), and even with other “peripheries” like Galicia, the Valencian Country, the Balearic Islands, etc. The “Spanish left-wing parties,” evidently include the PSOE and the catch-all category often simplified with the expression “to the left of the PSOE.” There are many elements that clash here, but the most decisive is the historical, and mutual, animosity between Catalanism and the Spanish left-wing parties. In recent years, there have been two attempts to overcome this animosity: Sumar (now Moviment Sumar), in low spirits as seen at its assembly last weekend, and Rufián's project, about which nothing concrete can be said because it hasn't even started yet. So, everything remains, for now, within the realm of hypotheses, mistrust, and (historical) grudges. Curiously, the Spanish right-wing and far-right do not have so many problems identifying their adversaries, nor in presenting them as enemies to be defeated, dehumanizing them if necessary. Indeed: they are all those who never agree among themselves.

Whether or not the current legislature runs its course, Spanish politics is already anticipating the next general elections. I reflect on two related aspects that will significantly influence them: the rise—or fall—of Vox, and the continued relevance of the Catalan issue in the general Spanish debate.

The Spanish political system is weighed down by lead. It faces a very serious threat. It's not the first time this has happened, but now it presents a more menacing potential. During the Transition, the heirs of Francoism and the representatives of the democratic forces worked side by side to build a model that favored alternation between two major parties. This model, reminiscent of the 19th-century system of alternating power, sought to preserve stability, the primary concern in those uncertain years. There would be, they planned, a major center-right option and a major center-left option. The first party ended up being the current PP—after the UCD imploded—; the second, the PSOE. For this reason, in the eyes of some, the Transition culminated precisely with Felipe González's victory in 1982. This system has been called "imperfect bipartisanship."

Politics is the struggle for power. And in a democracy, it's governed by the principle of a simple majority, which grants a parliamentary majority. It's the civilized staging of what we call the class struggle, with the right/left dichotomy as the system's axis, often with a tendency towards caricature, the demonization of the adversary, and rhetoric that operates on the logic of "us versus them," turning the rival into an enemy. It's a brawl that transcends ideas, proposals, and decisions, often devolving, on each side, into expressions more akin to the psychopathology of petty differences.

One year ends and another begins. These are times, both personally and collectively, to take stock and formulate new goals. For our country, Catalonia, 2025 presents a mixed picture. Some aspects are clearly positive, others less so, and some are frankly adverse.

What life is like, especially what political life is like. The separatists have been saying for years that judges play politics. (They had a reason: "They are afraid!" and "Whatever you can do, let it do.".) Then Pablo Iglesias said it, in his own words. But last night, the president of the Spanish government said it live on Spanish public television. Pedro Sánchez was asked about the legal cases against his wife and brother. And he answered this:

The Spanish government has dusted off the Official Secrets Law that had fallen with the advance of the general elections in 2023. The Council of Ministers has approved the law in the second round, which now moves to the Congress of Deputies, where it will begin its parliamentary process. This law should allow the declassification of documents that were until now protected by the Francoist Secrets Law, which has been in force since 1968. "[With the law] we respond to one of the systematic recommendations of the European Commission regarding the rule of law in Spain [...] The new law complies with the European standards of advanced democracies," defended the Minister of Justice, the Presidency and Relations with Parliament, Félix Bolaños, at a press conference after the Council of Ministers.

Koldo-Ábalos-Cerdán. And the Civil Guard entering Ferraz 33 years later. It's happened again—the same old story, it should be said. Returning to the past is always regressive, involutive, depressive. And yet the novelty is that there isn't any. And the only surprise isn't that it's happening again, but that it's happening again, immutably, in the same way, without any change and in the most clumsy, botched version—dirty money and the ministry, recordings and envelopes, prostitutes and construction companies. No added sophistication. The septic tank of the trinket-trinket and downstairs. The same old story. But in the 25th century. That is, it happens when we wanted to believe that we had learned something from the previous decade, the ominous decade of corruption's metastasis—1,611 corruption cases in 2014, 305 of which were macro-summonses—that solid firewalls had never been established, and they had never been established again. And no. You see. Holy, we're back to it. The same thing. On the street. Both the crater of the black hole and the dense frustration, impotence, and democratic devastation.

Shall we make a little story?

The Trump presidency is a disruptive factor for all government formation processes around the world. Especially in Europe, which is the target of strong hostility from Trump, which, due to the war in Ukraine, is highly relevant.

On 22 June, Pedro Sánchez reached the end of a path that he had been paving for months: he pardoned political prisoners after they had spent almost four years in prison. He was laying the first stone to address the political conflict outside the courts. The next step was to resume the negotiating table that had been interrupted by the pandemic, and on 15 September the Spanish and Catalan governments' teams were photographed at the Palau de la Generalitat. But months have gone by and the Spanish government has been showing signs that, after pardoning political prisoners, the Catalan conflict is no longer a priority. And this became clear this Wednesday after the Spanish president closed the year defending the idea that right now the management of the pandemic is incompatible with immediately resuming dialogue with the Generalitat.

The second part of a legislature usually smells like the end of a term and politics takes on the colour of an election campaign. This is a universal law and it is also what is happening in Spanish politics, with its particularities and always so prone to outbursts.