Tankers that left the Persian Gulf before the war are now arriving at port. That is to say: the worst moment in terms of hydrocarbon availability is yet to come. But the disruption will not be permanent. For a paradoxical reason. US stocks hit their all-time high this week. Financial markets are telling Trump that they want peace and for him to stop the war. It is a market that Trump can manipulate with tricks for his own benefit, but hardly to encourage him to wage war if they do not want it. They are his friends and they have expressed themselves clearly. Nevertheless, the moment is dangerous. The temptation to flee forward will be there. But I believe that the Persian leaders, fanatical but not stupid, will understand, and that in a relatively short period an understanding will be reached that will allow both sides to claim victory. I think it will include an open Strait of Hormuz.

Economic analysis has promoted a strict conceptual distinction between, on the one hand, the total production of goods and services that an economy can potentially derive from its stock of capital and knowledge (the “fundamentals”) and, on the other, the institutions and norms that determine how production decisions are made and how the resulting gains are distributed among the members of the economy. It is a useful distinction, but one that can be dangerous if it opens the door to considering the former in isolation from the latter, as the realization of the potential described by the former may well depend on the latter. I will illustrate this with some examples.

Whether or not the current legislature runs its course, Spanish politics is already anticipating the next general elections. I reflect on two related aspects that will significantly influence them: the rise—or fall—of Vox, and the continued relevance of the Catalan issue in the general Spanish debate.

President Bush's (son) war in Iraq (2003-2011) and now Trump's war have similarities. But to gain perspective, it will be interesting to examine their differences.

I was impressed, and not only me, by the spectacular Chinese exhibition last Monday of humanoid robots dancing with a skill we used to associate with expert human dancers. This prompted three comments.

When we talk about research in Catalonia, we sometimes refer to the research ecosystem and other times to the research system. It's important to distinguish between these. The ecosystem is all-encompassing and lacks precise boundaries. You are part of the ecosystem if de facto You are. Being one doesn't depend on credentials. An ecosystem is always something chaotic and disordered. At its best, it's creative and dynamic. When something new ceases to be new and becomes orderly, new initiatives have already emerged that maintain the creative disorder. Catalonia has generated a research ecosystem that has gained considerable weight in Europe. We are relevant in all the arenas where it's necessary to be. But we can't be entirely proud because the ship on which we've gained ground is losing ground globally. Our ambition today should be to participate in European scientific leadership that corrects this situation.

A few days ago, I attended the annual assembly of FemCAT, a foundation that brings together some 150 Catalan business leaders. This was the year of the presidential transition (the appointment is for two years). I enjoyed the speeches of the outgoing president, Oriol Guixà, and the incoming president, Tatxo Benet, elected at the same assembly. Aware that FemCAT celebrated its 21st anniversary this January, I dedicate this article to explaining what it is and what it does. I should point out that the foundation does not measure its success by the number of members. Even so, its economic impact is significant: the companies led by its members have a combined global revenue equivalent to 10% of Catalonia's GDP.

In Davos, Europe showed resolve and, for the moment, halted the blow. There have been notable gestures from Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, and Mark Carney, former Governor of the Bank of England and now Prime Minister of Canada. Considering also the stance of Jerome Powell, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, it seems that the experience of a central banker provides the necessary self-confidence to avoid being intimidated. We have been fortunate that Trump's assault has caught us with a strong and prestigious ECB.

To evaluate the new regional financing proposal, we must be guided by past experiences and future expectations. Looking back, I note, positively, that financing negotiations are not an all-or-nothing situation that repeats itself endlessly, but rather a continuous process in which, despite obstacles, progress has been made in the right direction, at a pace that—in generational terms—allows us to glimpse an outcome that, while not perfect, will be satisfactory. Virtually all Catalan political forces can claim credit for having contributed to this effort. Looking ahead, I fear it could be very problematic, and that now, indeed, a drastic setback is possible.

A long stay in San Francisco has allowed me to closely follow the internal impact of the Maduro operation and witness examples of Trump's immigration policy: on the first day of operation at a friend's daycare, border patrol showed up to question the immigrant parents. I've also been able to observe what motivates this article: how Trump's European policy is perceived and what lessons we should learn.

I will continue the tradition of writing the last article of the year to take stock of these twelve months and point out what, in my opinion, has been radically new on the international political scene. I have little doubt: the upheaval of the first year of Trump's second presidency. Moreover, being in San Francisco during the Christmas period, and being able to talk with friends, colleagues, and family, helps me focus on the topic.

Towards the end of the last century, the EU introduced the term "European paradox" to highlight the contrast between European scientific research at a level comparable to that of the US and significantly lower results in terms of innovation and the creation of large companies. The subsequent academic debate on the reasons for this has been substantial. Professor Ruiz-Castillo, from Carlos III University, has been a major participant. Having read the literature, I offer my opinion, with less nuance than necessary. The cause is twofold: 1. The premise regarding the level of European science is not entirely sound. When the focus is placed on the most selective indicators of quality, the superiority of the US is clear. This difference at the top is significant because, until now, an implacable economic logic has prevailed in the world: whoever arrives first takes the whole pie. China understood this long ago.

The housing crisis—which isn't unique to us—is so acute and so present in the consciousness and lived experience of Catalans that there's no doubt it will be resolved, since, paradoxically, it's a very solvable problem. The challenge is to ensure the availability of decent housing for a population that continues to grow, but not indefinitely. It's also about providing for the visitors and temporary residents that a dynamic economy demands, while avoiding a disproportionate number of empty homes. It can be done.

An old and dear friend, Claudi Alsina, has passed away. We met in the mid-1970s in Berkeley. I was teaching, and he, a young mathematics professor at the architecture school, was visiting. We talked about everything, but especially about two subjects that marked his professional and civic life: mathematics and the university. So much so that, fifty years later, he has left us, on the one hand, some forty books on mathematics, both technical monographs—published in English, and some highly awarded—and popular science works—a field in which he had a very special talent and in which he displayed his characteristic humor. I know that in the last week of his life, helped by his beloved Carme and Victoria, he was proofreading galleys of his next—I don't want to say last—book.

Strategic sovereignty—or independence, or autonomy—are interchangeable terms that denote the set of public policies that respond to and adapt to the new and heightened geopolitical uncertainty generated by the succession of challenges that have shaken the 21st century. These began with the 2008 financial crisis and continued with the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the development of AI by American and Chinese digital giants, President Trump's new proposals for the international economic order, and the emergence of China as a major competitor in high-tech products. Given that the adoption of a principle of strategic sovereignty will greatly influence what we do or do not do, it is worthwhile to analyze the scope of the concept. I offer two observations: 1. The notion of strategic sovereignty is not intended to be a universal principle, as, for example, the principles of free markets or decarbonization are: if we believe they are good for a country, it follows that they are also good for the regions within that country. In fact, it is understood that these principles are advisable for any country. However, strategic sovereignty must always be linked to the sphere of the political entity to which it applies. In our case, its relevance is at the European level, which for me means the EU and the United Kingdom. At this level, it is a principle that, when properly applied, is highly appropriate and strengthens Europe. A paradoxical consequence of the objective of strengthening Europe is that neither Tarragona, nor Catalonia, nor Spain should aspire to this sovereignty. The adoption of the principle strengthens Europe, while its adoption by individual European states weakens Europe, and those states themselves. Strategic sovereignty is defensive in nature, and Europe will not be strengthened if the prevailing attitude of the states is one of distrust and protectionism. For those of us who want to play the European card—for me, the only card worth playing—what is desirable is strategic independence externally and strategic interdependence internally. From Catalonia and Spain, what is in our best interest is for Europe to make the strategic sovereignty program a cornerstone of its economic competitiveness and, at the same time, for Catalonia and Spain to integrate themselves as effectively as possible into the value chains associated with this program. It is also important that European institutions place similar emphasis on both aspects. For example, externally, we need to have our own structures—derived from our own knowledge—for AI or satellites. Internally, we need to develop infrastructures designed to facilitate collective efficiency, and therefore interdependence, among European economies. In short: we must vigorously promote the content of the Letta-Draghi reports.

It is common to set economic policy targets as minimum percentages of GDP for the corresponding expenditure. Examples: Trump demands 5% of GDP for defense from Europe, the EU 3% for R&D investment, the OECD 1% for environmental spending, Spanish university laws 1% for universities, and a proposed popular legislative initiative (ILP) 6% for education. There are also targets, less tied to specific policies, that demand maximum levels. For example, the EU Stability and Growth Pact sets a maximum fiscal deficit of 3% of GDP.

In 2000, with the Lisbon Declaration, the EU set the goal of becoming "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world." We've already reached 2025, and we're not. But we are a knowledge-based economy, since, as everywhere, knowledge permeates everything around us. It's what gives us prosperity and well-being. It's also what gives us headaches. For Europe, the demanding challenge today is whether we will be significant producers of knowledge and whether, with the many levers at our disposal, we will know how to leverage it to generate high-value intellectual property (IP), as well as the economic activity that makes it profitable. The competitiveness and strategic sovereignty agendas converge on this objective.

This year's Nobel Prize in Economics celebrates two contributions that underlie contemporary understanding of the economics of innovation, and consequently, of economic growth. One, by Joel Mokyr, has already been featured in an article in the ARA (by Albert Carreras, October 13). I will dedicate this one to the work of Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, who jointly formulated a theory of innovation based on Joseph Schumpeter's concept of "creative destruction." It is rigorous, empirically testable, and useful for public policy.

John Maynard Keynes, so focused on the short- to medium-term that he left us the phrase "in the long run we shall all be dead," spoke at least once about the long term. It was in 1930 at a lecture at the Ateneo de Madrid. In the midst of an economy in deep depression and suffering from "a severe attack of economic pessimism," he expressed surprisingly optimism about the "economic possibilities of our grandchildren" (the title of the lecture). He said: "We are suffering, not from the rheumatism of old age, but from the growing pains generated by very rapid change." The expression "technological unemployment" is introduced in this lecture. Keynes concludes by adding (I paraphrase) that "the rate at which we shall arrive at plenitude (bliss) economic will depend on our ability to control demographics, our determination to avoid wars and civil strife, and our faith in science."

We have the ambition to become a driving economy in Europe. That is, a highly productive economy, embedded in the best European value chains and generating good salaries. That's why we need an economy not only based on knowledge but also with a significant component of our own knowledge (intellectual property). A necessary, but not sufficient, condition to achieve this is having a world-class research ecosystem. Everything can be improved, but I would say we have it. The public sector has contributed decisively to this. We must take care of it and maintain it.